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ABSTRACT 
 
Covered warrants have been traded in Finland since the 8th of December 2000. 
These instruments allow investors to gain leverage and also to speculate on the fu-
ture value of an underlying asset with minimal capital. How does this affect the 
stocks underlying the covered warrants, if at all? What are the implications of the 
issuance of this kind of instruments to the overall market? The impacts of these in-
struments have been under debate in academic literature for over three decades.  
 
This thesis adds to the already existing literature by studying the impact of first-
time introductions of covered warrants on a sample of underlying stocks traded on 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. The examined time period is between the years 2000 and 
2007. The dataset consists of all first-time issued covered warrants traded in the 
Finnish stock market during this period. 22 stocks with first-time issued covered 
warrants are found and after adjustments 14 stocks are selected to the sample.  The 
price, liquidity and volatility impacts of the first time covered warrant introduc-
tions to the underlying stocks are studied. To test for these impacts a time interval 
of 90 days before and after the introduction and issuance dates of the covered war-
rants is examined, with both unadjusted and market-adjusted metrics. To control 
for the small sample size, effect size tests are utilized. 
 
The results of the empirical tests are inconclusive. No impact on the prices of the 
underlying stocks is found. Liquidity metrics show some increase in bid-ask 
spreads, even though this increase is not completely attributable to the warrant is-
suance. Volume is found to increase. Volatility is found to be relatively stable sur-
rounding the listing dates of the covered warrants, with some decline witnessed.  
 
KEYWORDS: Covered warrant introduction, derivatives, price impact, stock re-
turn volatility, bid-ask spread, NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since options have been traded it has been argued what kind of impact, if any, 
these derivatives have on the underlying asset or the whole market. The basic the-
ory of options assumes that the introduction of these derivatives should have no 
effect on the price of the underlying asset. Despite of this theoretical assumption 
Ross (1977) was one of the first theorists to suggest that options could actually give 
investors more choice in the market, which in turn would affect the price of the 
underlying asset. Eventually this suggestion gave rise to a number of studies con-
cerning the impacts that derivatives could have on the underlying market. An era 
of study between ‘real’ and ‘synthetic’ securities is born. The issues that are most 
prevalent in these studies are three fold. First issue studied is whether the deriva-
tive markets make the securities markets more complete or not. The second issue is 
impact of the introduction of derivatives markets on the operational efficiency of 
the markets. The third issue is the effect that the derivative markets have on the 
informational efficiency of the underlying market. These studies have lead to an 
overall academic debate on whether the trading in derivative instruments is bene-
ficial or disadvantageous to the underlying market. (Grossman 1988; Ross 1977; 
Sahlstöm 2001)   
 
Among the arguments for the derivative markets are that the introduction of op-
tions should expand the opportunity set faced by the investor making the market 
more complete. This means that derivatives give investors a chance to take posi-
tions on the underlying which were not possible prior to the introduction of de-
rivatives. Another argument supporting the introduction of options is that options 
should give the investors more freedom when reacting to new information by re-
ducing friction, transaction costs and short-selling constraints. It is also argued that 
because the options markets allow for the profitable trading of private information 
the introduction of options gives more stimulus to the investors to collect and use 
this information. (Conrad 1989; Sahlström 2001)  
 
Arguments against the derivative markets have also risen. One of these arguments 
is based on the speculative nature of derivatives, which in turn could increase the 
volatility of the underlying market. It is also argued that the introduction of op-
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tions could decrease the liquidity of the underlying stocks as investors focus on the 
options instead of the underlying. Noise could also be increased after option intro-
duction in the underlying market as option strategies involve a lot of long and 
short positions. There are also concerns that “… these instruments may be “driving 
down the value of stocks and other securities” …” (Conrad 1989: 487). These and 
many more arguments for and against these derivative instrument exist still today 
and while new more complex instruments are developed continually there seems 
to be no end in sight for the on- going debate. (Aitken 2005; Conrad 1989; Sahl-
störm 2001) 
 
In general there are two broad categories of warrants: equity warrants and covered 
warrants. The listed company itself issues equity warrants. When equity warrants 
are exercised, new common shares will be released. This affects the value of an in-
dividual stock adversely as the number of shares increases, but the assets remain 
unchanged. A third party other than the issuer of the underlying securities or its 
subsidiaries issues covered warrants. Thus exercising covered warrants leaves the 
total number of outstanding stocks unaffected. (Yan 2000) 
 
Throughout this thesis the warrants mentioned are all covered warrants. One of 
the main differences between an option and a covered warrant is that when the 
covered warrant is exercised, the ownership of the underlying is not affected. In-
stead exercising a covered warrant always results in a cash settlement. Hereafter 
when the term ‘warrant’ is used, it will be referring to covered warrants. 
 
 
1.1. Motivation 
 
The motivation behind this study is the ever-growing topical interest of market 
participants towards covered warrants, especially warrants in the Finnish stock 
market. While much of the existing work has focused on the impact of exchange-
traded options, few studies have examined the impact of covered warrant intro-
duction on the behavior of underlying stocks. Warrants also offer a relatively easy 
way to start investing or speculating on an underlying with minimal capital, mak-
ing it more attractive to a bigger audience. The basic theory suggests that options 
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could raise underlying stock prices, lower them, or leave them unaffected. The un-
derlying assumption is that common equilibrium effects are small enough to have 
no economic significance. This theoretical ambiguity alone justifies the need for ex-
tensive empirical research. It has also been hypothesized that the warrant issuers 
try to hedge their positions by buying or short selling the underlying stocks prior 
to the new warrant introduction. It may also be, that the warrant issuers want to 
benefit from the warrant issuance by introducing the new products to the market 
when the underlying asset is displaying certain characteristics to ensure high pre-
miums.  A part of the motivation is also the fact that the majority of the previous 
studies on exchange traded derivative introductions has been focused on the U.S. 
markets and mainly on exchange traded options.  
 
Although there are some inconsistencies between the conclusions of the previous 
studies, on the whole one can note that option introductions have been associated 
with significant volatility decreases, price increases and liquidity increases in the 
underlying market. The key motivation in this study is to see whether or not the 
same conclusions apply to the small Finnish stock market with a similar kind of 
derivative (i.e. warrant). There have been no prior studies that the author is aware 
of concerning the impact of initial covered warrant introduction to the relatively 
small Finnish stock market, although equity warrants have been studied by 
Salhström (2001) and Kaivolahti (2008). The results of this thesis can also help in-
vestors to gain a better understanding of the trading behavior in underlying stocks 
surrounding warrant issuances, enabling investors to make informed investment 
decisions. 
 
 
1.2 Hypotheses 
 
These hypotheses are derived from previous studies concerning the impact of ini-
tial covered warrant introductions on the underlying stock market. The first impact 
studied on this thesis is the price impact that the new covered warrant has on the 
underlying stock.  
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Price impact 
 
The view that derivative introductions change the underlying prices on equilib-
rium and allocations to investors for the positive is supported by several empirical 
studies (Hakansson (1982), Green and Jarrow (1987), Hodges (1992)). According to 
these studies the investment opportunity set available for the investors is ex-
panded by the introduction of derivatives. This expansion then makes the overall 
market more complete and enables investors to utilize more elaborate strategies to 
gain higher reimbursements. In accordance with this argument Ross (1976) argues 
that “… in an uncertain world derivatives written on existing assets can improve 
efficiency by permitting an expansion of the contingencies that are covered by the 
market.” (Ross 1976: 75) All the aforementioned studies conclude that derivative 
introductions should improve the welfare of the trader and are associated with a 
positive price effect.  
 
Also Conrad (1989) documents a permanent price increase following the option 
introduction, but in contrast she finds support for the view that derivative securi-
ties in general may be malign to investors. This argument states that trading in 
these instruments may be driving down the value of stocks and other securities 
and is supported by Miller (1977), Figlewski (1981) and Danielsen and Sorescu 
(2001). 
 
A few large financial institutions dominate the issuance market in Finland with in-
terests different to those of an option exchange. It can be hypothesized that when a 
warrant issuer perceives a mispricing opportunity it is more likely that it will issue 
a warrant. Because of the fact that warrant markets have thrived for several years 
now, it can also be assumed that warrant issuers are able to operate profitably. As 
the profits for the warrant issuers come from the warrant premiums, the issuances 
of call (put) warrants could give a pessimistic (optimistic) perception of the future 
movement of the underlying asset. This can produce abnormal price declines (in-
creases) in the underlying asset resulting from the covered warrant issuance. This 
situation denotes straight wealth transfers to financial intermediaries in the form of 
warrant premiums paid by the investors. This view is supported by a study con-
ducted by Aitken and Segara (2005). 
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As an theoretically conclusive argument is yet to be found, and the findings of Ait-
ken et al. (2005) in mind, the following hypothesis is derived for the price impact: 
 
H1 : There should be a negative price impact on the underlying stocks following the  
introduction of the new covered call warrant. 
 
Liquidity impact 
 
The second impact that studied in this thesis is the impact that the introduction of 
the new covered warrant has on the underlying stocks liquidity. This impact has 
also been studied quite extensively, with most of the studies concluding that an 
increase in the trading volume of the underlying stock follows the derivative in-
troduction. 
 
Skinner (1989) studied the liquidity impact and suggested that the introduction of 
derivative instruments could divert attention towards the aforementioned from the 
underlying stock itself. This then, according to this hypothesis, results in a decrease 
of the stocks liquidity. While at first glance this analogy seems to be feasible, con-
tradicting his own hypothesis Skinner (1989) found a significant increase in the 
raw trading volume of the underlying following the derivative introduction. These 
findings are supported by Ho and Liu (1997) who find that the mean daily per-
centage trading volume increases significantly after the option listing. These in-
creases in underlying trading volume following first-time warrant introduction are 
linked by previous studies to the needs of the warrant issuer’s hedging activity. 
This view is backed up by Aitken et al. (2005) study where they conclude that the 
aforementioned hedging activity is in part paid for by wealth transfers from inves-
tors to financial institutions issuing these derivatives. These views lead to the sec-
ond hypothesis:  
 
H2 : Underlying stock liquidity should increase following warrant introduction. 
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Volatility impact 
 
The third impact studied is the impact the introduction of a covered warrant has 
on the underlying stock’s volatility. The findings of the previous studies regarding 
the impact on the underlying stocks volatility are the most homogenous. Most of 
the previous studies conclude that the volatility should decrease after the deriva-
tive introduction. (Alkebäck & Hagelin 1998; Sahlström 2001) 
 
According to Sahlstöm (2001), under the assumption that option markets improve 
the underlying markets’ operational and informational efficiency, option introduc-
tion should lead to a more precise price adjustment process, decrease the noise ef-
fect and lower bid-ask spreads. It is also hypothesized that the introduction of op-
tions may attract new informed traders to trade. In fact the findings of Sahlström 
(2001) support the hypothesis that stock option market increases the efficiency of 
the underlying market. Especially the informational asymmetry shows signs of be-
ing lower following the option introduction. This would then indicate a stabilizing 
effect of the introductions. The overall consensus within the results of previous re-
search conducted on the option introductions volatility impact seems to be quite 
clear-cut; with a few exceptions the majority of the previous research concludes 
that option introduction reduces the volatility of the underlying stock. 
 
Nonetheless Bollen (1998) and Mayhew and Mihov (2004) conclude that in order 
for options exchanges to list an option the underlying stocks must meet certain cri-
teria for options exchanges to list derivatives on them. Mayhew et al. (2004) also 
report that according to sources inside the option exchanges, unusually high or ris-
ing variance is one of the selection criteria. This makes the option introduction an 
endogenous event i.e. introducing options and warrants on large and highly vola-
tile stocks is more attractive to the issuers. Aitken et al. (2005) note that the single 
characteristic that makes the covered warrant issuance diverge from the option is-
suance is the profit motives of the warrant issuers. These profit motives accompa-
nied by the issuers capability to dictate when the warrant is issued indicates that 
the aforementioned are indeed able to generate significant gains from larger war-
rant premiums when the underlying is anticipated to be more volatile. Thus the 
hypothesis concerning the volatility impact of covered warrant introduction is as 
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follows: 
 
H3: Underlying stock return volatility increases following warrant introduction.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Firstly the motivation of this thesis is ad-
dressed followed by the definition of the hypotheses. A review of the previous 
studies related to the topic is presented in section two. Section three presents the 
theoretical background of this thesis. In section four the dataset and methodology 
utilized are presented. Section five consists of the empirical results of this thesis. 
Section six concludes and addresses subjects for further studies. 
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2. Previous studies 
 
In this part some of the previous studies concerning impacts of option and covered 
warrant introductions will be addressed. Although the impacts of the introduc-
tions of derivative instruments have been widely researched, the results seem to be 
surprisingly inconclusive. Moreover studies concerning the impacts of covered 
warrants are quite scarce. Nonetheless the one conclusion that most of the re-
searchers of this topic seem to hold in common is the decrease in the volatility of 
the underlying stock after the option listing. 
 
 
2.1 Price effect 
 
Black and Scholes (1973) view options as redundant securities which means that 
they can be valued with a no-arbitrage relation and thus in their model, option in-
troduction can have no price effect on the underlying security. Ross (1976) was the 
first theorist to suggest that option introduction would have an impact on the un-
derlying stocks price. In his study Ross (1976) suggests that options may affect un-
derlying stock prices by giving investors more choices and opportunities in the 
markets. Nonetheless Ross (1976) does not provide any further evidence regarding 
this price effect.  
 
Miller (1977) argues that if short selling constraints are enforced, the absence of this 
possibility causes a synthetic disparity in the demand–supply relationship, which 
can result in higher equilibrium prices. Miller (1977) concludes that this disparity 
would cease to exist and the prices would subside to a new equilibrium following 
the introduction of option trading. Given that the sample in the study of Miller 
(1977) does not include the period when option listings resulted in positive price 
changes, extending these findings to a more general setting should not be feasible.  
 
The value conservation capabilities of different market structures are studied by 
Hakansson (1982). Admitting that these comparisons are more demanding than 
expected, Hakansson (1982) finds that the opening of options markets, on equilib-
rium, are strongly beneficial for the consumers active in investing. Hakansson 
(1982) also adds, with the redistributive characteristics of options in mind, that the 
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introduction of option markets is probably the simplest and easiest way to achieve 
these aforementioned effects. As a side note, taking into account the current finan-
cial turmoil, partly stemming from certain types of derivatives and financial prod-
ucts, this statement could also awake some discussion among the consumers if 
presented today. Nonetheless the findings of Hakansson (1982) are based on equi-
librium assumptions and can thus still be considered as valid. 
 
Conrad (1989) examines the impact of option introductions on individual securi-
ties. In her study she concludes that the option introduction is followed by a per-
manent increase in the underlying assets price. Conrad (1989) finds that this price 
increase correlates positively to the opening day trading volume of the option. This 
effect is found to begin 3 days before the option introduction. These facts support 
the hypothesis that dealers or other traders are investing in the underlying for 
hedging purposes in anticipation of the trading volume in the option.  
 
Early studies by of Branch and Finnerty (1981) and Detemple and Jorion (1990) 
document positive excess returns in narrow windows around call option introduc-
tions in accordance with Conrad (1989). Detemple et al. (1990) show that option 
introduction produces lower equilibrium prices. According to their studies it is 
also possible to procure higher stock prices with differing initial investments. In 
stark contrast to Conrad (1989) Ho et al. (1997) find a significant reversal in price 
behavior surrounding option introduction; a price increase starting approximately 
100 days prior to option introduction is found followed by a price decrease after 
the introduction date. 
 
The effect of option listings on the quality and quantity of information produced, 
and the speed with which stocks respond to new information are studied by 
Jennings and Starks (1986) and Damodaran and Lim (1991) respectively. The evi-
dence from these aforementioned studies suggests that prices of optioned stocks 
adjust more quickly to new information than non-optioned stocks. 
 
However, more recent work by Sorescu (2000) shows that the price effect of option 
introductions follows two divergent, distinct patterns, with an explicit breakpoint, 
taking place around July 1981. Prior to the aforementioned breakpoint the option 
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introductions were followed by a positive price impact while introductions after 
that date appeared to have a negative price impact. Although Sorescu (2000) pro-
vides no clear explanation for this 1981 pattern alteration, he notes that the pre-
1981 positive price effects might be related to the market completion characteristics 
of options, a hypothesis first suggested by Detemple and Jorion (1990). According 
to this hypothesis, the “market completion” effect would have ceased in April 
1982, when index options first began to trade. Another possible explanation for this 
anomaly could be that stock price reactions prior to 1981 might indicate an amal-
gamation of both the release of short sale constraints and some other unknown, 
exogenous factor that acts in the opposite direction. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) 
analyze the link between diminishing short sale constraints and the price impact of 
post-1980 option introductions and report a significant relationship between these 
two factors, which could give some insight for understanding this anomaly al-
though nothing conclusive can be derived from this.  
 
Chan and Wei (2001) examine the price effects of underlying stock around the an-
nouncement date of covered warrants. They find a price decline 2–3 days after the 
warrant announcement. In addition, they find that underlying stocks have abnor-
mal increases in price and volume during the last 5 minutes of trading on the war-
rant issuance day. According to Chan et al. (2001) this might be due to investors' 
speculation on the future value of the asset caused by information leakage about 
the successful warrant issuance and/or to the profit motives of the financial inter-
mediaries trying to attain higher initial warrant premiums.  
 
In more recent studies Aitken et al. (2005) find no price increase prior to the cov-
ered warrant issuance. On the warrant announcement date Aitken et al. (2005) find 
a statistically significant price decline in the underlying asset. The aforementioned 
is also witnessed on the first trading date to follow the announcement. This price 
decline is followed by slow price deterioration. As an explanation for this Aitken et 
al. (2005) suggest that warrant issuers continuously hedge their open positions by 
using equity options and/or underlying stock with different weights. 
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2.2 Liquidity impact 
 
The impacts of derivative introductions on stocks liquidity metrics, both volume 
and bid-ask spread, is the least studied impact of the three impacts selected in this 
thesis. The results from these studies concerning the volume effects are the most 
conclusive of the aforementioned; a statistically significant increase in volume is 
found to follow the derivative introduction. The effects on the bid-ask spreads are 
more inconclusive.  
 
In addition to price effects Branch et al. (1981) study the effects of option introduc-
tion on the underlying stocks volume. They conclude that initial call option intro-
ductions are followed by a statistically significant increase in the relative volume of 
the underlying. After the call option introduction the increase in volume is re-
ported to continue for a few weeks. This view is supported by Bansal, Pruitt and 
Wei (1989) who study options listed on the CBOE between 1973 and 1986, and find 
an increase in total trading volume following the option listing. 
 
 A more extensive study is conducted by Long, Schinski & Officer (1994) who also 
study volume effects of initial option introductions. Their study consists of 111 
OTC firms with options listed on the five option exchanges of Chicago (CBOE), 
New York (NYSE), American (AMEX), Philadelphia (PHLX), and Pacific (PSE) be-
tween June 1985 and June 1990. These firms are then studied over a period of 260 
days before and after the initial option listing. An increase in the trading volume of 
the underlying OTC firms is reported. This increase is reported to being largest in 
the small- and medium-sized firms. Long et al. (1994) add that the increase is not 
evident only due to larger trade size, as the number of trades is also notably in-
creased. These results are similar than those of Wei, Poon and Zeen (1997) who 
also notice an increase in volume, but receive mixed results regarding the behavior 
of bid-ask spreads. This study by Wei et al. (1997) is examined more extensively in 
the following chapter of this thesis discussing the volatility impacts. 
 
Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998) find similar results with a different approach.  
They use a broad range of microstructure characteristics in their analysis. Kumar et 
al. (1998) conclude that option introductions are followed by a decrease in bid-ask 
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spreads and an increase in volume.  
 
Draper, Mak & Tang (2001) have also studied the effects of new derivative warrant 
issuance in Honk Kong. In their study Draper et al. (2001) find an increase in vol-
ume of trading as a result of the introduction. These findings are confirmed by 
Chan et al. (2001) who find a higher level of trading activity in the underlying 
stock for 5 days around the warrant announcement date. 
 
A part of a study conducted by Sahlström (2001) is to analyze the impact of new 
option introductions on the bid-ask spreads of the underlying stock in the Finnish 
stock market. In this study a decrease in the bid-ask spreads is noticeable after the 
option introduction. This decrease is significant in all different time intervals stud-
ied. The explanation for this decrease is not that definite, since according to Sahl-
ström (2001), a large part of the change in the spreads can be associated with 
changes in the spreads of the whole market. Sahlström (2001) also finds a notable 
difference between the short- and the long-period analysis. As an explanation for 
this Sahlström (2001) suggests that “… the spreads of the entire market are esti-
mated using stocks with quite infrequent trading which is associated with large 
spreads. Changes in the trading volume of these stocks cause changes in the 
spread, which may significantly affect the market spread.” (Sahlström 2001: 29) 
 
In their study Aitken et al. (2005) study the liquidity impacts of introducing new 
covered warrants to the Australian stock market. These liquidity impacts are stud-
ied by two distinct metrics: relative volume and relative bid-ask spreads. Aitken et 
al. (2005) find both an increase of relative trading volume and an observable in-
crease in bid-ask spreads. The results of the volume impact are statistically signifi-
cant. The results from the effects these introductions have on the bid-ask spreads 
are more inconclusive; the observable increase in the bid-ask spreads does not give 
grounds to reject their null hypothesis that bid-ask spreads would differ signifi-
cantly pre- and post-warrant listing in any of their estimation intervals. Nonethe-
less Aitken et al. (2005) note that the observed bid-ask spread increase is consistent 
with their findings regarding a decrease in the underlying price. 
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2.3 Volatility impact 
 
The volatility impact of derivative introductions is widely debated among the aca-
demics. There are several studies that conclude that the derivative introduction has 
no significant effect on the underlying stocks volatility (Bollen 1998; Draper et al. 
2001). Nevertheless the majority of studies concerning this topic conclude that the 
option or warrant introduction has a negative impact on the stocks volatility, even 
though there are some who find that the volatility actually increases following the 
aforementioned event. 
 
The voice of the majority is represented by a study conducted by Conrad (1989). In 
her study she finds that the price effect is accompanied by a decline in volatility 
but the systematic risk appears to stay unaffected by the option introduction. In 
accordance with Conrad (1998), Gemmill (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990) 
,Damodaran and Lim (1991) and Sahlström (2001) also find a decrease in volatility 
of the underlying following a derivative introduction. Alkebäck and Hagelin (1998) 
also find a decrease in volatility and bid-ask spreads in line with a previous study 
conducted by Vinell and De Ridder (1990). Kumar et al. (1998) also studied the im-
pacts of option introduction on volatility, concluding that the underlying volatility 
is decreased after the introduction. Long et al. (1994) also studied the impact of an 
initial option listing on the price volatility of underlying OTC stocks. In their study 
Long et al. (1994) found no evidence of changes in price volatility following option 
listing.  
 
Average stock return variances also change following initial options listings ac-
cording to St. Pierre (1998) although Bollen (1998) contradicts this by concluding 
that option introductions do not significantly affect stock return variance because 
the differences between the control group and the optioned group used were sta-
tistically inseparable. The conclusions of Bollen (1998) receive support from several 
studies as Trennepohl and Dukes (1979), Klemkosky and Maness (1980), Chamber-
lain, Cheung and Kwan (1993), and Gjerde and Saetem (1995) find no significant 
impact on volatility. Similar results are also found by Bengtsson and Tikkanen 
(1994). The results of Bengtsson et al. (1994) can be biased as they use unadjusted 
estimates of volatility. Nonetheless, the findings of Bengtsson et al. (1994) are sup-
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ported by Draper et al. (2001) who also find no significant impact on volatility after 
the warrant introduction. 
 
Although in most of the research conducted on the volatility effect of option intro-
duction the volatility or return variance seems to decline or remain unaffected, 
there are a few exceptions. Wei et al. (1997) examine the changes in spreads, price 
volatility, and trading activity surrounding option listings for a sample of 144 OTC 
stocks listed between 1985 and 1990. Controversially Wei et al. (1997) find an in-
crease in the price volatility of the underlying stock. They attribute the increase in 
price volatility primarily to an increase in unsystematic risk. Wei et al. (1997) also 
test for changes in residual-return variances, market-adjusted return variances and 
raw return variances. A considerable increase that is statistically significant at the 
one per cent level is found. Furthermore, price volatility increased even after the 
authors control for volume, insider trading, and spreads. Even though the afore-
mentioned does not fully explain the causes for the increase in price volatility, the 
results of the study suggest that the effect of insider trading on the price volatility 
is not as strong as the effect of liquidity trading or volume. 
 
Heer, Trede and Wahrenburg (1997) study the effects of option trading at the DTB 
(Deutsche Terminbörse). They use a sample of 15 optioned stocks and compare this 
to a control sample comprised so that it has approximately the same size and in-
dustry structure as the basic DTB sample. Daily spot prices between 2 March 1987 
and 31 August 1993 are used. Dividend payments and capital increases are taken 
into account by adjusting the prices. In contrast to most of the other research con-
ducted, they also find similar behavior than Wei et al. (1997) from the DTB. The 
stocks in their sample become more volatile after option introductions. Heer et al. 
(1997) note that while the median variance of the control sample declines by 15% 
the median variance of option listed stocks rises by 34% over a 250-day interval. 
This makes the relative increase of return variance to reach up to almost 50%. One 
of the explanations for this increase in volatility according to Heer et al. (1997) 
seems to be the strong increase in trading volume on optioned stocks in the DTB. 
Nonetheless the authors themselves admit that their sample of only 15 stocks is 
quite small and furthermore 14 of them were optioned on the same day. Therefore 
the results of Heer et al. (1997) should be interpreted with discretion as the data 
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might be biased in some way. 
 
In accordance with Heer et al. (1997) and Wei et al. (1997) the results of Aitken et 
al. (2005) indicate that the volatility of the underlying stocks is elevated for the 
post-warrant listing period. According to Aitken et al. (2005) these findings suggest 
that speculation in the underlying assets is stimulated by derivatives. The explana-
tion for this perceived volatility increase offered by Aitken et al. (2005) is that war-
rant issuers are able to time the issuance of warrants and are motivated by profit to 
list warrants during a time of increased speculation or volatility in the underlying 
stock, which in turn secures higher premiums for the issuers. Aiten et al. (2005) 
also find that warrant holders are out of the money for the majority of trading days 
during the maturity of their warrants. These findings support the speculation that 
the direction of wealth transfers is from the consumer to the financial institutions.  
 
The abundance of previous studies concerning this subject is staggering, as ever 
since options were first introduced to the market in 1973, the effects of these intro-
ductions have been discussed. Only the most relevant studies for this thesis were 
chosen, as this is merely a glimpse to the sea of studies concerning derivative in-
troductions both on stocks and indices as underlying. In table 1 a summary of the 
findings of the previous studies is presented. 
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 Table 1. Summary of the findings of the previous studies 
Note: This table presents the summary of the results of previous studies. In this table “i” = increase, 
“d” = decrease and “inconsistent” implies that there was no significant change or the results were 
conflicting in some other way. 
Study Market Price Liquidity Volatility
Miller (1977) USA i
Trennepohl & Dukes (1979) USA inconsistent
Klemkosky & Maness (1980) USA inconsistent
Branch & Finnerty (1981) USA i i d
Bansal, Pruitt & Wei (1989) USA i d
Conrad (1989) USA i d
Gemill (1989) USA d
Skinner (1989) USA i d
Detemple & Jorion (1990) USA d d d
Vinell & De Ridder (1990) Sweden d d
Damodaran & Lim (1991) USA d
Chamberlain, Cheung & 
Kwan (1993)
Canada
Bengtsson & Tikkanen 
(1994)
Sweden inconsistent
Long, Schinski & Officer 
(1994)
USA i inconsistent
Gjerde & Saettem (1995) Norway i inconsistent
Heer, Trede & Wahrenburg 
(1997)
Germany i i
Ho & Liu (1997) USA d i inconsistent
Wei, Poon & Zee (1997) USA i inconsistent i
Alkebäck & Hagelin (1998) Sweden d d
Kumar, Sarin & Shastri 
(1998)
USA i d
Sorescu (2000) USA inconsistent
Chan & Wei (2001) Hong Kong d i
Danielsen & Sorescu (2001) USA d
Draper, Mak & Tang (2001) Hong Kong d i inconsistent
Sahlström (2001) Finland d d
Aitken & Segara (2005) Australia d i i
Kaivolahti (2008) Finland i inconsistent
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3.Theoretical background 
 
In this part of the thesis the theoretical background is presented. Firstly the under-
pinnings of market efficiency are discussed followed by a closer look on how the 
theory of efficiency works in practice. Then stochastic processes and the key ele-
ments underpinning the most used pricing formulae in Finance i.e. the Black-
Scholes-Merton differential equation are discussed. This is followed by a short look 
on the characteristics of covered warrants.  
 
 
3.1 Market efficiency 
 
In the 1950s’ one of the early applications of computers was to analyze economic 
time series. Business cycle theorists felt that a natural candidate to trace the evolu-
tion of several economic variables over time was the behavior of stock prices. A 
study by Maurice Kendall (1953) examines this behavior. Kendall (1953) is unable 
to identify any predictable patterns in stock prices. Kendall (1953) concludes that 
the data provides no way to predict price movements and the results appear to 
confirm the irrationality of the market. (Kendall 1953)  
 
It soon became apparent that random price movements indicated a well-
functioning or efficient market, instead of an irrational one. The efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) became a topical part of economic theory on the strength of em-
pirical tests in large part undertaken by finance theorist Eugene Fama in his 1970 
study “efficient capital markets a review of theory and empirical work” published 
in the Journal of Finance. Fama (1970) concluded that the market seems to price se-
curities as if there was a rational process behind this. In fact, the EMH can be seen 
as the inherent consequence of thinking about financial asset prices as equilibrium 
in a competitive market environment consisting of pragmatic market participants. 
The EMH states that competition between experienced investors empowers the 
stock market to consistently price stocks so that they are in line with the expecta-
tions of the long-term earnings of the underlying assets. (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
2008: 369-372; Haugen 1997: 642; Langevoort 1992)  
 
For the markets to be considered as efficient, the prices in a given market must al-
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ways fully reflect all available information. There are three basic categories of mar-
ket efficiency under the EMH:  
 
1.Under the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices are assumed to 
reflect any information that may be contained in the past history of the stock price 
itself. Under the weak hypothesis all patterns derived from historical data of stock 
price movements will be priced away by intelligent or informed traders thus mak-
ing it impossible to predict the future course of any series by analyzing its past be-
havior i.e. using technical analysis. Reaching this state, the weaker form of the effi-
cient market hypothesis will be satisfied. 
 
2. Under the semistrong form of the efficient market hypothesis, all publicly available 
information is assumed to be reflected in securities’ prices. This includes informa-
tion in the stock price series as well as information in the firm’s accounting reports, 
the accounting reports of competing firms, announced information relating to the 
macro- and microeconomic outlooks, and any other publicly available information 
relevant to the valuation of the firm e.g. the quality of the management, patents 
held, accounting practices etc. 
 
3. The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis is the most inflexible form of the 
hypothesis. Under the strong form all information is reflected in stock prices. This 
includes private, or inside information as well as that which is publicly available. 
This form of market efficiency is accepted as quite extreme and as the difference 
between private and inside information if often vague it is often accepted on a 
purely theoretical basis. (Haugen 1997: 643-644; Bodie et al. 2008: 373) 
 
In an idealized world the efficiency of the market place would mean the following 
conditions to be met: 
 
1. No transaction costs in trading securities.  
 
2. All available information is available without cost to all market participants.  
 
3. All agree on the implications of current information for the current price and 
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distributions of future prices of each security. (Fama 1970; Glen and Hornung 
2005) 
 
Efficiency in the realm of EMH can be further divided into two aspects: price effi-
ciency and market efficiency. Price can be considered efficient in two ways; the 
current price of a security best predicts its future price and the prevailing price 
immediately absorbs new information provided to the market. To do this, the 
mechanism of price formation somehow captures information about and predicts 
the future payment of a security. In addition this aforementioned mechanism also 
absorbs the information from the investor who happens to know of this relevant 
information. Market efficiency is thus premised on the assumption that all relevant 
information will be available to the market and that the market rapidly, if not in-
stantaneously, digests all information as it becomes available. (Gordon & Korn-
hauser 1985; Jeffrey et al. 1985; Glen et al. 2005) 
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) claim that the assumptions that all markets are al-
ways in equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are inconsistent when arbi-
trage is costly. The aforementioned inconsistency is explained by the fact that, if 
the equilibrium would be true, the informed would gain less than the uninformed 
because of the costs of collecting the information. Thus Grossman et al. (1980) 
claim that all the information is not included in the prices. (Grossman et al. 1980; 
Grossman 1988) 
 
In his research for market efficiency Fama (1970) concludes that, with but a few ex-
ceptions, the efficient markets model stands up well and adds that “one would not 
expect such an extreme model to be an exact description of the world, and it is 
probably best viewed as a benchmark against which the importance of deviations 
from market efficiency can be judged.” (Fama 1970: 414) 
 
The conclusions of Fama (1970) are very concise when breaking down the three 
hypotheses of market efficiency. Moving from the weak form of the hypothesis to 
the strong form, various types of investment analysis becomes ineffective in dis-
criminating between profitable and unprofitable investments. 
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If the weak form is valid, technical analysis or charting becomes inefficient. If the 
weak form is in effect, there is no information in the past series that is useful in 
predicting the future. If the semistrong form of the efficient market hypothesis is in 
effect, no form of analysis will help an investor to gain superior returns as long as 
the analysis is based on publicly available information. In order to attain abnormal 
returns, investors must resort to attempts to uncover, or purchase, private informa-
tion. When the strong form is in effect, there is no way to acquire superior returns; 
those who acquire inside information act on it and quickly force the price to reflect 
the information and all efforts to seek out insider information to beat the market 
are futile. (Haugen 1997: 645-646) 
 
In order to find out whether the real market we are observing is efficient or not it 
should be noticed that an efficient market exhibits certain behavioral traits or char-
acteristics.  If the real market does not conform to these traits it can be concluded 
that the real market under observation is inefficient. If the market is efficient it 
should exhibit the following characteristics: 
 
1. Security prices should respond quickly and accurately to new relevant informa-
tion. 
 
2. Changes in the risk premiums and the level of the risk-free rate associated with 
the security should be the only factors related to the changes in expected security 
returns from one period to the next. Returns related with other factors than the 
aforementioned, should be unpredictable. 
 
3. Examining the attributes of current investments should not be of any assistance 
when choosing between profitable and unprofitable investments in the future. 
 
4. There should be no statistically significant differences between the average in-
vestment performance of the informed and the uninformed investors. Differences 
found should be because of coincidence instead of systematic differences in the 
abilities of the investors to find information not already incorporated in stock 
prices. (Haugen 1997: 647) 
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In conclusion it can be stated that the market seems to be sufficiently efficient 
meaning that the information and / or insight that enables the investor to gain 
even marginal profits needs to be superior. This implies that with hard work, re-
search, intelligence and a bit of luck it is possible for the professional investor to 
constantly “beat the market”. As Bodie et al. (2008) conclude, “… the easy pickings 
have been picked.” (Bodie 2008: 405) 
 
 
3.2 Stochastic processes 
 
If a certain variables’ value changes over time in an uncertain way it is said to fol-
low a stochastic process. There are two types of stochastic process classifications; 
discrete time or continuous time. In a discrete-time stochastic process the value of 
the variable can change only at certain fixed points in time. In a continuous-time 
stochastic process the changes take place at any given time. Stochastic processes 
can also be divided into continuous variable or discrete variable stochastic proc-
esses. When a continuous-variable process is at hand the underlying variable can 
take any value within a determined range. In a discrete-variable process, only cer-
tain discrete values are possible. (Hull 2005: 263) 
 
In practice stock prices are not observed following continuous-variable, continu-
ous-time processes. Stock prices have individually separate and distinct values and 
changes in these prices can be distinguished only when the market place is open. 
Nonetheless the aforementioned processes have been proven to be a useful model 
for many purposes. Some of these purposes could include modeling stock prices or 
predicting certain instruments’ future movements in risk (i.e. volatility). The main 
reason for considering stochastic models is the fact that they lead to generalized 
results. These results are beneficial in empirical analysis and theoretically abun-
dant. (Malliaris 1983) 
 
The Markov property 
 
A Markov process is a specific type of stochastic process where solely the present 
value of a variable is applicable for predicting the future. The previous values of 
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the variable and the way that the present has manifested from the past are not per-
tinent. As a rule Stock prices are presumed to follow a Markov process is. As the 
Markov property is consistent with the weak form of market efficiency, it insinu-
ates that the probability distribution of the price of the underlying is independent 
of the movements of the aforementioned in the past. If the weak form of market 
efficiency were not true, above-average returns would be possible to anyone by in-
terpreting charts of the past history of stock prices. (Hull 2005: 264) 
 
Wiener process 
 
Wiener process is a certain type of Markov stochastic process with a mean change 
of zero and a variance rate of 1.0 per year. It is also known as Brownian motion. If a 
certain variable 
! 
z  has the following two attributes it is said to follow a Wiener 
process: 
  
Property 1. The change 
! 
"z  during a small period of time 
! 
"t  is  
 
 (1) 
! 
"z = # "t  
 
where 
! 
" has a standardized normal distribution 
! 
"(0,1).  
 
This insinuates that 
! 
"z  itself has a normal distribution with 
 
Mean of 
! 
"z = 0 
            Standard deviation of 
! 
"z = "t  
             Variance of
! 
"z = "t  
 
Property 2. The values of 
! 
"z  for any two differing diminutive intervals of time, 
! 
"t , 
are discrete. 
 
This property indicates that 
! 
z  follows a Markov process. These findings are next 
discussed in a more generalized setting. (Hull 2005: 265) 
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Generalized Wiener process 
 
The elementary Wiener process, 
! 
"t , has a drift rate of zero and a variance rate of 
1.0. Zero drift-rate indicates that the expected value of 
! 
z  at any future time is the 
same as its current value and a variance rate of 1.0 implies that the variance of the 
change in 
! 
z  in a time span of length 
! 
T  equals 
! 
T . In terms of 
! 
"z  a generalized Wie-
ner process for variable 
! 
x  can be defined as 
 
 (2) 
! 
"x = a"t + b"z  
 
where 
! 
a  and 
! 
b are constants. 
 
The 
! 
a"t  term indicates that 
! 
x  has an anticipated drift rate of 
! 
a  per unit of time. 
The 
! 
b"z  term can be regarded as adding volatility to the path followed by 
! 
x . The 
amount of this volatility is 
! 
b times a Wiener process. Thus  
! 
b times a Wiener proc-
ess has a standard deviation of 
! 
b. In a minute time span 
! 
"t , the change 
! 
"x  in the 
values of 
! 
x  is given by equations (1) and (2) as  
 
 (3) 
! 
"x = a"t + b# "t  
 
where 
! 
" has a standard normal distribution. It follows that 
! 
"x  also has a normal 
distribution with 
   Mean of 
! 
"x = a"t  
 Standard deviation of 
! 
"x = b "t  
       Variance of 
! 
"x = b2"t  
 
Homogenous justifications to those given for a Wiener process show that altera-
tions in the value of 
! 
x  in whichever time span 
! 
T  is normally distributed with 
 
Mean of 
! 
"x = aT  
 Standard deviation of 
! 
"x = b T  
       Variance of 
! 
"x = b2T  
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It follows that the generalized Wiener process (2) has an expected drift rate of 
! 
a  
and a variance rate of 
! 
b
2. (Hull 2005: 265-268) 
 
Geometric Brownian motion 
 
The stochastic process generally assumed for a stock price is geometric Brownian 
motion. In this process the enticing assumption that a stock price follows a general-
ized Wiener process, is replaced by a more appropriate assumption. This assump-
tion states, that the stock’s price does not affect the expected percentage return re-
quired. The constant drift rate assumption is thus replaced by the assumption that 
the expected return is constant. The geometric Brownian motion model in its es-
sence designates the probability distribution of the possible future values of a secu-
rity. (Chriss 1996: 97; Hull 2005: 270) 
 
A sensible presumption is that the variability of the percentage return in a short 
period of time, 
! 
"t , is the same in spite of the stock price; the same amount of uncer-
tainty can be found in the expected returns whatever the value of the stock. From 
this can be concluded that the standard deviation of the change 
! 
"t  should corre-
spond to the stock price. This leads to the model 
 
 (4) 
! 
dS = µSdt +"Sdz   
 
or 
 
(5) 
! 
dS
S
= µdt +"dz  
 
This equation (4) is the most widely used model of stock price behavior, it is know 
as geometric Brownian motion. (Hull 2005: 270) 
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Graph 1. Geometric Brownian motion 
 
 
Itô’s lemma 
 
The price of any derivative is a function of the stochastic variables underlying the 
derivative and time. Based initially on solely mathematical questions, K. Itô dis-
covered in 1951 an important result in this area; it is known as Itô’s lemma. Even 
though Itô’s theory was not enough by itself for the formulation and solution of 
the financial and economic models of today, it was still critical in laying the foun-
dations for future breakthroughs in solving major economical problems. Thus the 
findings of K. Itô are still widely used in the financial markets of today as many 
theories, estimation methods and models are based on these.  (Hull 2005: 273; Mal-
liaris 1983) 
 
Let us assume that 
! 
x  follows the Itô process  
 
(6) 
! 
dx = a(x, t)dt + b(x,t)dz  
 
Itô’s lemma shows that a function 
! 
G of 
! 
x  and 
! 
t  follows the process 
 
(7) 
! 
dG =
"G
"x
a +
"G
"t
+ 1
2
" 2G
"x 2
b
2
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( dt +
"G
"x
bdz   
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where 
! 
dz  is a Wiener process (6) and as a result 
! 
G also follows an Itô process, with 
a drift rate (8) and  variance rate (9) of 
 
  (8) 
! 
"G
"x
a +
"G
"t
+ 1
2
" 2G
"x 2
b
2  
 
  (9) 
! 
"G
"x
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
2
b
2  
 
As argued earlier, equation (4) with 
! 
µ and 
! 
"  constant, is an equitable model of 
stock price movements. When Itô’s lemma is applied to the aforementioned the 
process followed by a function 
! 
G of 
! 
S  and 
! 
t  is 
 
  (10) 
! 
dG =
"G
"S
µS +
"G
"t
+ 1
2
" 2G
"S2
# 2S2
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) dt +
"G
"S
#Sdz . 
 
Uncertainty, represented by 
! 
dz  affects both 
! 
S  and 
! 
G. Itôs lemma is said to be in 
some respects “… as useful to stochastic calculus as the chain rule is for ordinary 
calculus.” (Malliaris 1983: 484) This is also one of the milestones in the derivation 
of the Black-Scholes results, which will be discussed next. (Hull 2005: 270; Malliaris 
1983) 
 
 
3.3 The Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation 
 
In 1973, Myron Scholes and Fischer Black published their pioneering paper on op-
tion pricing, Black and Scholes (1973). The Black-Scholes model revolutionized fi-
nancial economics in several ways. First, it contributed to our understanding of a 
wide range of contracts with option-like features. Second, it allowed us to revise 
our understanding of traditional financial instruments. Third, these formulae have 
become probably the most used mathematical equations in the history of financial 
markets. Fourth, the formulae derived are also the basis for a huge number of stud-
ies regarding derivatives and other financial instruments. Fifth the Black-Scholes 
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model has proven itself as a very nimble model as it can also be utilized to value a 
diverse set of assets such as commodities, bonds or foreign currencies. The effect 
that these formulae alone have had on the financial world of today justifies the 
extensive presentation and derivation of these equations. (Brearley, Myers & Allen 
2008: 600; Black & Scholes 1973; Hull 2005: 281) 
 
Assumptions 
 
Underlying the Black-Scholes option-pricing model is the Black-Scholes-Merton 
differential equation. The assumptions used to derive the Black-Scholes model are 
as follows: 
 
1. Short-term interest rates are known and uniform through time.   
 
2. The stock price follows a random walk i.e. Geometric Brownian motion dis-
cussed in chapter 3.2. It follows that the distribution of conceivable stock prices at 
the end of any fixed interval is lognormal. The stocks’ return variance is constant. 
 
3. There are no dividends or other distributions during the life of the stock. 
 
4. The option is of European style. 
 
5. No transaction costs or taxes for the stock or the option.  
 
6. Borrowing at the short-term interest rate is possible.  
 
7. There are no short selling restrictions. (Black and Scholes 1973) 
 
Derivation 
 
The derivation of the Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation is based on the 
assumption that the stock price follows the geometric Brownian (4) motion dis-
cussed earlier in chapter 3.2. 
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Assume that 
! 
f  is the price of a derivative dependent on 
! 
S . The variable 
! 
f  must be 
some function of 
! 
S  and 
! 
t . From Itô’s lemma we get, 
 
  (10) 
! 
df =
"f
"S
µS +
"f
"t
+ 1
2
" 2 f
"S2
# 2S2
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) dt +
"f
"S
#Sdz . 
 
The distinct versions of equations (4) and (10) are 
 
  (11) 
! 
"S = µS"t +#S"z  
 
and 
 
  (12) 
! 
"f =
#f
#S
µS +
#f
#t
+ 1
2
# 2 f
#S2
$ 2S2
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* "t +
#f
#S
$S"z  
 
 
where 
! 
"S  and  
! 
"f  are changes in  
! 
f  and 
! 
S  in 
! 
"t . As mentioned earlier in the dis-
cussion about Itô’s lemma in section 3.2 the Wiener processes underlying 
! 
f  and 
! 
S  
are the same. Choosing a distinct portfolio containing a certain amount of the stock 
and the derivative can then eliminate the Wiener process. The appropriate portfo-
lio for the elimination of the Wiener process is a portfolio where the holder is short 
one derivative and long an amount 
! 
"f "S  of shares. 
! 
" denotes the value of the 
portfolio. (Hull 2005: 291) By definition  
 
  (13) 
! 
" = # f +
$f
$S
S . 
 
The change 
! 
"# in the value of the portfolio in 
! 
"t  is given by 
 
  (14) 
! 
"# = $"f +
%f
%S
"S . 
 
When equations (11) and (12) are substituted into equation (14) the following result 
is arrived at 
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(15) 
! 
"# = $
%f
%t
$ 1
2
% 2 f
%S2
& 2S2
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
, "t . 
 
The portfolios must thus be riskless during time 
! 
"t  as this equation does not in-
volve 
! 
"z . The assumptions underlying the Black-Scholes model indicate that the 
portfolio must immediately earn the same rate of return as other securities with 
similar traits. If these securities would earn more than this return, it would be pos-
sible to make riskless profit by borrowing money to buy the portfolio; if it earned 
less, risk-free profit would be possible by selling the portfolio short and buying 
risk-free securities. (Black et al. 1973; Hull 2005: 292) Thus 
 
  (16) 
! 
"# = r#"t  
 
where 
! 
r  denotes the risk-free interest rate. When equations (14) and (15) are substi-
tuted into (16), the following is acquired 
 
  (17) 
! 
"f
"t
+ 1
2
" 2 f
"S2
# 2S2
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) *t = r f +
"f
"S
S
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) *t  
 
so that 
 
  (18) 
! 
"f
"t
+ rS
"f
"S
+ 1
2
# 2S2
" 2 f
"S2
= rf  
 
This equation (18) is the groundbreaking Black-Scholes-Merton differential equa-
tion. It has as many solutions as there are different derivatives that can be defined 
with 
! 
S  as the underlying variable. The particular derivative that is derived when 
the equation is solved depends on the boundary conditions specified. These boundary 
conditions define the values of the derivative at the upward and downward thresh-
olds of possible values of 
! 
S  and 
! 
t . As in the case of a European call option, the key 
boundary condition is 
 
  (19) 
! 
f =max(S "K,0) when 
! 
t = T  
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In the case of a European put option, it is 
 
  (20) 
! 
f =max(K " S,0) when 
! 
t = T . 
 
It should also be noticed that the portfolio used in the derivation of equation (18) is 
not constantly riskless. It is riskless only for an exceptionally short period of time. 
As 
! 
S  and 
! 
t  change, 
! 
"f "S  also changes. To keep the portfolio riskless, it is there-
fore necessary to repeatedly change the relative weights applied to the derivative 
and the stock in the portfolio. (Hull 2005: 292) 
 
Risk-neutral valuation 
 
Unquestionably the single most important tool for the analysis of derivatives is 
risk-neutral valuation. It stems from one key attribute of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
differential equation (18), which is that the equation does not contain any variables 
that can be affected by the risk preferences of investors. The variables included in 
the equation are the current stock price, time, stock price volatility, and the risk-
free rate of interest. All of which are not dependant on risk preferences. Thus the 
risk preferences cannot affect its solution. It follows that any set of risk preferences 
can be used when evaluating 
! 
f . From this stems a very simple assumption; all in-
vestors are risk neutral. This leads to a conclusion that the expected return on all 
investments is the risk-free interest rate. A risk neutral world is characterized as a 
place where the investors require no risk premium for their investments. In such 
an investment environment, the reason investors are neutral towards risk is be-
cause on an average there is no risk. (Chriss 1996: 190-191) 
 
It is important to note that risk-neutral valuation is merely a synthetic way to ac-
quire solutions to the Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation. From this it 
stems that even when investors are risk-averse, the solutions obtained are always 
viable. As long as our risk-averse reality fulfills the underlying assumptions of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation, the option prices derived from this 
model hold as well. This can be explained with an example: When moving from a 
risk-neutral world to a risk-averse world, two things happen; the expected growth 
rate in the stock price changes and the discount rate that must be used for any 
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payoffs from the derivative changes. These changes always cancel each other out 
precisely. (Chriss 1996: 191-192) 
 
Black-Scholes pricing formulas 
 
The Black-Scholes formulas are presented next. These formulas are for the prices at 
time 0. The options are a European call option (21) and a European put option (22). 
The underlying is a non-dividend paying stock. The formulas are as follows  
 
  (21)  
! 
c = S
0
N(d
1
) "Ke
"rT
N(d
2
)  
 
and 
  
 (22) 
! 
p = Ke
"rT
N("d
2
) " S
0
N("d
1
) 
 
,where   
 
(23) 
! 
d1 =
ln(S0 K) + (r +"
2
2)T
" T
 
    
(24) 
! 
d2 =
ln(S0 K) + (r "#
2
2)T
# T
= d1 "# T . 
 
The function 
! 
N(x)  represents the cumulative probability distribution function for a 
standardized normal distribution. (Chriss 1996: 180) 
 
 
3.5 Covered warrants 
 
In this section the covered warrants will be discussed in more detail. The key 
properties of the aforementioned and how they are different from exchange-traded 
options or equity warrants will be discussed. 
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The term warrant corresponds to a large number of differing derivatives. The ter-
minology concerning warrants is quite heterogeneous. Term derivative warrant is 
used in Hong Kong only. It is called covered warrants in Britain, naked warrants in 
Germany, and structured warrants in Singapore. In Australia, no distinction in 
designation between warrants issued by underlying companies or a third party in-
stitution is made. There is, however, a distinction made between warrants with in-
dividual stock as underlying and warrants with stock indices as underlying, which 
are equity warrants and index warrants respectively. In mainland China, warrants 
issued by underlying companies and third party institutions are treated the same. 
The first covered warrants were issued already in the 1980’s. Since then the expan-
sion of the warrant market has been fierce. The biggest warrant markets are 
Hongkong, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and France. (Aitken 2005; Deutsche Bank 
2009; LSE 2009; Nelskylä 2004: 15; SFC Hong Kong 2005; SGX 2009)  
 
A covered warrant is a derivative similar to an option. While an option is a con-
tract between two parties and traded on a securities exchange such as EUREX, a 
covered warrant is a securitized option that is traded on the stock exchange.   
When a covered warrant is bought the right to either buy or sell an underlying as-
set is actually purchased. This asset is usually a stock but can also be an index, a 
basket of stocks, a currency or a commodity. When a covered warrant is bought a 
future price as well as exercise price and expiration date is agreed upon. The party 
that sells the warrant is called an issuer. The issuer is a traditional bank or an in-
vestment bank operating on the stock exchange. At the expiration date the issuer of 
the warrant is obligated to buy or sell the underlying asset if the buyer wants to 
exercise the warrant. In practice though, the ownership of the underlying remains 
unchanged even if the warrant is exercised. Exercising a warrant always leads to a 
cash settlement. Because the buyer of a warrant has the right not to participate at 
the expiration date the investor has to pay compensation to the issuer. This com-
pensation is simply the price of the warrant. (Nelskylä 2004: 15-20) 
 
Covered warrants (and options) offer an investor or a trader a disparate opportu-
nity set of risk/return payoffs that would be possible with the underlying security 
only. Warrants as well as options give the investor a leveraged position in the un-
derlying security. The biggest difference between exchange traded options and 
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warrants is the counter-party risk included in the covered warrant. The options 
market eliminates the counter-party risk through margining and the clearinghouse, 
while warrants are issued by a bank or investment bank that guarantees payment. 
The purchaser of the warrant thus bears counterparty risk if the issuer of the war-
rant defaults. (Yan 2000; Nelskylä 2004: 20) 
 
According to Aitken et al. (2005) even though warrants can be regarded as similar 
to options, it can be assumed that warrant introductions will have differing effects 
on the underlying assets as the issuing banks are active in the market and have 
significantly differing interests than those of an option exchange. The issuers use 
dynamic hedging strategies to manage the liabilities that stem from warrant intro-
ductions and the positions that follow. Investing in the underlying assets and / or 
the actual warrants themselves gives the issuers the ability to hedge their positions 
or even manage their profits. This strategy is dependant on conditions specific to 
certain markets and will differ among issuers. (Aitken et al. 2005) 
 
Benefits of covered warrants 
 
Covered warrants can be beneficial to the investor for a number of reasons. Firstly 
covered warrants offer significant leverage with minimal capital. This is because 
the percentage value of the warrant never changes less than the value of the under-
lying. Covered warrants also offer unlimited potential for profit with the losses 
limited to the total loss of capital invested. Thus an investor investing in warrants 
can never lose more than the capital invested. With covered warrants the investor 
knows the maximum loss in advance, which is not the case with short put options 
for example. The liquidity and the relatively low trading costs of the covered war-
rants can also be noted as a benefit as they are more liquid and cheaper to trade 
than options. In addition covered warrants offer the investor a chance to invest not 
only during bull-markets, but also in bearish market conditions. (Nelskylä 2004: 
30-33) 
 
Covered warrants also offer broader investment possibilities as the underlying as-
sets can range from commodities to currencies. Investors can also add diversifica-
tion to their portfolios on a country level with minimal capital and with more and 
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more exotic instruments very innovative payoff profiles are made possible. Addi-
tional benefits include the fact that covered warrants are exchange traded and thus 
must be approved not only by the exchange itself but also by the overseeing offi-
cial of the market like SEC in the USA or FIN-FSA in Finland. The issuers of the 
covered warrants are not comparable to the bookies, as they must hedge their posi-
tion to stay market neutral. From this follows that whenever an investor loses on a 
warrant, the issuer does not win. In fact the more the investor wins on a covered 
warrant the more likely it is that the investor will continue investing in warrants 
and thus benefiting the issuer of the covered warrant. As the issuers are market 
neutral, the more the individual investors know about these products and the 
more they gain on them is beneficial to the issuer. Covered warrants are also prod-
ucts aimed for the private investor; this again broadens the investors’ opportunity 
set on the market as the issuers try to match the demand of the market by issuing 
new warrants with differing characteristics and underlying assets. (Nelskylä 2004: 
33-36; SFC Hong Kong 2005) 
 
Drawbacks of covered warrants 
 
With many benefits of the covered warrants, there are also drawbacks. Some bene-
fits mentioned in the previous section can also be considered as drawbacks, but 
that is a debatable issue not in the scope of this thesis.  
 
The first and maybe foremost drawback of covered warrants is the complicated na-
ture of these instruments. While covered warrants allow for great gains in the 
market, they are still derivative instruments with corresponding risks. One of the 
main contributors to this complexity is the relationship between the covered war-
rant and the volatility of the underlying asset. As volatility is a subjective estimate, 
it is possible for two distinct issuers to attribute a differing estimate of the volatility 
of the underlying to an otherwise identical covered warrant. This then will affect 
the price of the aforementioned instruments, making these in other respects identi-
cal products differ in price. This volatility estimate used by the issuers is not dis-
closed making these instruments even harder to understand for the everyday in-
vestor. The only way for an investor to deduce the volatility estimate used in the 
pricing of a certain covered warrant is to calculate the implied volatility of the in-
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strument. This implied volatility is then, in some respects, also based on assump-
tions. Because of this inbuilt risk inherent from their complexity covered warrants 
are not suitable for everyone. (Fortune 1996; Nelskylä 2004: 36-37; SFC Hong Kong 
2005) 
 
The limited maturity and the accompanying leverage can also be seen as draw-
backs, as covered warrants can expire worthless. With limited maturity comes also 
another disadvantage in comparison to stocks is the diminishing time-value of 
these instruments. Because of this diminishing time-value the investor must be 
careful when speculating with these instruments. The shorter the time to maturity, 
the lower the value of the warrant. The rough estimate of the diminishing time 
value with covered warrants is that on the first half of the maturity of the instru-
ment one third of the time-value will have diminished. The rest of the time-value 
will then diminish on the second half of the maturity of the instrument with in-
creasing speed. (Nelskylä 2004: 38; SFC Hong Kong 2005) 
 
Turbo warrants 
 
Turbo warrants are a form of covered warrants with distinct characteristics. As 
some of the warrants under scrutiny in this thesis are turbo warrants, a short 
glance in their characteristics is to follow. Turbo warrants are special types of bar-
rier options in which the rebate is calculated as another exotic option. The name 
turbo warrant first emerged in Germany at the end of 2001. This name was given 
to a usual down and out - style barrier option, having its strike price as the barrier. 
Later the French bank Societe Generale issued a contract called a turbo warrant in 
early 2005. This instrument was defined as a down and out - style barrier option. 
The barrier was set to be in the money and the owner of the instrument was to re-
ceive a rebate if the barrier is hit. This rebate can be reconsidered as a new contract, 
which is essentially a call option on the effectuated lower limit. There are essen-
tially two types of turbo warrants; Turbo warrant calls (turbo-calls) and Turbo 
warrant puts (Turbo-puts). (Eriksson 2006) 
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The payoff functions of turbo warrants differ from options and covered warrants 
in the following manner. If the price of the underlying asset is assumed to evolve 
according to  
 
(25) 
! 
S(t) = S(0)e
(r"
1
2
# 2 )t+#W (t )  
 
,where W is some Brownian motion. Given a barrier 
! 
b > 0 and a strike price 
! 
K  < 
! 
b, a turbo-call warrant pays  
 
(19) 
! 
f =max(S "K,0), when, 
! 
t = T   
 
at the maturity of the warrant if the predefined barrier has not been hit by the un-
derlying stock at any time when the turbo call warrant is alive. If the barrier is hit 
at time 
! 
t  then a rebate  
 
(27) 
! 
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is paid at time 
! 
t + µ . 
 
The pay-off of a turbo-put warrant is defined in a similar fashion. In the turbo-put 
case 
! 
K > b  and the pay-off at the maturity of the turbo-put is defined as 
 
(28) 
! 
f =max(K " S,0) when 
! 
t = T  
 
if the stock price stays below the predefined barrier until the maturity of the war-
rant. If again the barrier is hit at time 
! 
t  while the warrant is still alive a rebate de-
fined by 
 
(29) 
! 
(K " (max
0#u# t S(t) + µ))  
 
is paid at 
! 
t + µ . Here 
! 
min0"u" t S(t) and 
! 
max
0"u" t S(t) denotes the running minimum 
and maximum respectively. 
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There is a common belief that turbo warrants are less sensitive to the change in 
volatility of the underlying asset than for example regular warrants. However, the 
characteristics and pricing of these instruments under stochastic volatility are still 
unknown. (Persson & Eriksson 2006; Eriksson 2006)   
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4.Data and Methodology 
 
In this part the dataset used in this thesis will be described. The type of data, data 
extraction methods and data sources will also be tackled. Also the time period of 
this study will be addressed. Following this will be discussion about the method-
ology by which the data is interpreted. 
 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The data used in this study consists of daily closing quotes of all stocks traded in 
the OMX Helsinki from the last quarter of the year 2000 through 2007. The afore-
mentioned time span is selected because the trading of covered warrants began in 
December of the year 2000. First time covered warrant announcement and issuance 
dates are derived from the OMX Helsinki disclosures. Issuer and underlying in-
formation are presented in table 3. Daily closing prices for covered warrants and 
the underlying stocks traded in the OMX Helsinki stock exchange are also gath-
ered from the same time period. The announcement and listing dates were derived 
from the OMX Helsinki News database with the courtesy of University of Vaasa. 
First time covered warrant issuance and announcement dates are then matched 
with the aforementioned stocks. A total of 22 stocks with covered warrants issued 
for the first time are found. After controlling for the fact that this thesis concerns 
only covered call warrants, 17 stocks remain in the sample. For 3 of the aforemen-
tioned stocks insufficient data is found. The final sample is thus the stocks of 14 
firms traded in the OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistic for the dataset. The covered warrant issuance by years can be found in 
Graph 2. In table 3 the covered warrant issuer and underlying information are pre-
sented. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for dataset 
 
 
Graph 2. New covered warrant issuance by years 
 
 
Estimation interval +/-30 +/-60 +/-90
Sample size (N) 420 840 1260
Statistic Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0006 -0.0015 0.0007 -0.0012
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 0.1957 0.1304 0.1984 0.1304 0.1984 0.1309
Minimum -0.1301 -0.1317 -0.1301 -0.1317 -0.2152 -0.1317
Standard deviation 0.0334 0.0297 0.0315 0.0304 0.0316 0.0307
Skewness 0.9550 -0.0757 0.8067 -0.1965 0.3650 0.0198
Kurtosis 5.8699 3.5992 6.3821 2.5841 7.2278 2.7830
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Table 3. Covered warrant issuer and underlying information 
 
 
Market efficiency in the OMX Helsinki  
 
The Finnish stock market i.e. the OMX Helsinki has been a subject for a few studies 
concerning the efficiency of the marketplace. Berglund & Liljeblom (1988) study 
the thinly traded OMX Helsinki during 1977-1982 (formerly known as HeSE, Hel-
sinki Stock Exchange) and find significant positive first-order serial autocorrela-
tion. These results are confirmed by a study by Kallunki (1997) in which a longer 
time span from 1976 to 1990 is utilized. Further studies by Kallunki & Martikainen 
(1997) and Sahlström (2001) also confirm the existence of first-order serial autocor-
relation in the Finnish stocks. According to these studies it seems that the first or-
Issuer Underlying ISIN Trading Code
AlfredBerg NOK1V FI0009602767 1KNOKEW500
AlfredBerg SRA1V FI0009602809 1KSRAEW260
AlfredBerg UPM1V FI0009602940 2BUPMEW360
AlfredBerg STERV FI0009602957 2BSTEEW110
ArosMaizels ELI1V FI0009603054 2CELIEW240
Handelsbanken TIE1V FI0009605224 3ITIEEW400
Handelsbanken ERIBR FI0009609978 4EERIEW100
Handelsbanken NDA1V FI0009611198 4FNDAEW550
Handelsbanken SAMAS FI0009615322 5CSAMEW900
Handelsbanken NES1V FI0009622021 6FNESEW270
Nordea OUT1V FI0009638100 7ROUTEW240
Handelsbanken MRLBV FI0009640817 7LMRLEW40T
Handelsbanken MEO1V FI0009640833 7LMEOEW40T
Handelsbanken KNEBV FI0009640858 7LKNEEW40T
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der autocorrelation structure of the Finnish stocks has been relatively stable over 
time. These results also give rise to the question whether or not the Finnish stock 
market is weak form efficient. If so then abnormal returns would be possible by 
ways of technical analysis for example. Nevertheless according to Sahlström (2001) 
study the introduction of stock options reduces this autocorrelation and thus 
makes the overall market more efficient.  
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
Event study methodology is selected to determine whether the three hypotheses’ 
presented earlier in chapter 1.2 can be accepted or not. The metrics utilized in the 
price impact analysis, liquidity impact analysis and volatility impact analysis are 
presented and defined next. As the sample size used in this thesis is relatively 
small, effect size metrics are also utilized in selected tests. These metrics will be 
discussed after the presentation of the impact analyses. 
 
Price impact analysis 
 
An event study methodology is utilized to resolve whether the first-time introduc-
tions of warrants have an effect on the underlying stocks returns i.e. H1. Daily, dis-
crete, dividend adjusted closing price returns are used. A similar event study 
methodology as used by Aitken et al. (2005) is utilized. The underlying stocks’ re-
turn behavior is studied around both the announcement date and listing date of 
covered warrants. An event window of 31 days surrounding the warrant issuance 
date i.e. day-0, is selected. The selected event window thus spans from day -15 to 
day 15. The behavior of the stocks’ returns on the selected interval are monitored 
with two distinct metrics; daily raw returns, 
! 
RR
it
, and daily market-adjusted ab-
normal returns 
! 
AR
it
. They are calculated using the following formulas:  
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where 
! 
P
it
is underlying stock 
! 
i ’s closing price on day 
! 
t  and 
! 
OMXH
t
 is the closing 
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value of the OMX Helsinki Cap index on day 
! 
t . The OMX Helsinki Cap index is 
selected because it controls for market capitalization by giving each stock a maxi-
mum weight of 10% in the portfolio. By selecting the Cap portfolio index the re-
sults will be unaffected by the stock price movements of the large companies 
traded in OMX Helsinki giving a more accurate result.  
 
The main reasons for selecting the 31-day event window around day-0 are two 
fold. Firstly monitoring the underlying price return changes for 31 days allows for 
any price impacts that eventuate immediately before or after the warrant introduc-
tion to be distinguished. Secondly, the selected method will take into account the 
expectations built into the issuance as well as the possible real effects following the 
introductions. To obtain if the mean of raw returns and abnormal returns on a par-
ticular event day are significantly less than zero a standard one-tailed t-test is util-
ized.  
 
The price changes of the introduced covered warrants will also be examined in six 
event windows. Prices 5, 10 and 15 days after the warrant listing date will be com-
pared to the prices 15, 10 and 5 days before the warrant exit date. A Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test is utilized to test for statistically significant differences after the war-
rant listing and before the warrant maturity. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is chosen 
because it avoids the assumptions of the standard t-test with minimal loss in effi-
ciency. 
 
The issued warrants will also be subject to moneyness analysis derived from Ait-
ken et al (2005). Moneyness for covered call warrants is defined as:  
 
(32) 
! 
MONEYNESS =
S " (X +WP)
(X +WP)
x100%  
 
,where S denotes the closing stock price of the underlying and X is the exercise 
price. WP is the warrant premium. This premium is adjusted by the number of 
warrants that must be exercised to obtain one unit of the underlying i.e. the con-
version ratio. The conversion ratio influences the price of the warrant, but not the 
exercise price, because the trading prices are quoted on a per warrant basis but the 
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exercise price is quoted on a per asset basis. When MONEYNESS > 0, call warrants 
holders are in the money i.e. in a profit position. When MONEYNESS < 0, call war-
rants holders are out of the money i.e. in a loss position. The moneyness of the 
warrant holder is then studied for a 31-day event window, ranging from 15 days 
before and 15 after the introduction, for each underlying.  
 
Liquidity impact analysis 
 
The second hypothesis H2 is tested by two distinct liquidity metrics: relative trad-
ing volume and relative bid-ask spreads.  
 
The impacts of the warrant introductions on the underlying stocks volume is stud-
ied by a method derived from Aitken et al. (2005) study. In this method dividing 
the trading volume of each firm by the total number of securities outstanding for 
that trading day forms a ratio for each time period before and after the warrant in-
troduction. The time periods chosen are 30, 60 and 90 days before and after the 
warrant listing. The statistical differences of these ratios will then be examined by 
utilizing a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test for each of the three time periods.  
 
Relative bid-ask spreads will be studied by following the methodology utilized by 
Sahlström (2001). Bid-ask spreads are defined as the difference between the lowest 
ask and the highest bid during a trading day. Copeland and Galai (1983) note that 
as lower trading volume is usually a result of less recurrent trading, it is probable 
that the bid-ask spread is reversely related to measures of market activity. Bid-ask 
spreads are also prone to fluctuate with the price of a stock and are frequently ex-
posed to capricious minimum tick size rules. Thus a relative bid-ask spread 
method, derived from Sahltröm (2001) is used. In this method relative bid-ask 
spreads are calculated by dividing the dealers bid-ask spread by the average of the 
bid-price and the ask-price. It is defined with the following formula (Sahlström 
2001: 26) 
 
(33) 
! 
relativespread =
askquote " bidquote
(askquote + bidquote) /2
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Relative bid-ask spreads are then calculated for each stock for three intervals of dif-
fering lengths; 30, 60 and 90 trading days before and after the warrant issuance. 
Daily average relative bid-ask spreads of the total market for the same time inter-
vals were also calculated. From the relative bid-ask spread results those that im-
plied that a bid- or ask-quote was not available, were excluded. In accordance with 
Sahlström (2001) to control for intertemporal shifts in the market, daily market-
adjusted relative spreads are calculated. Daily market-adjusted relative spread is 
calculated by dividing the relative bid-ask spread of the stock with the matching 
daily average relative bid-ask spread of the total market. These bid-ask spread 
metrics are then studied with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for statistical differences 
before and after the warrant issuance 
 
Volatility impact analysis 
 
A similar approach that is also used in the study conducted by Aitken et al. (2005) 
is used to test for the third hypothesis i.e. the impact of the new covered warrant 
issuance on the underlying stocks volatility. These volatility impacts are tested by 
forming variance ratios. These variance ratios are formed by dividing the esti-
mated volatility of each stock after warrant introduction by their estimated volatil-
ity before. A ratio larger than one would indicate an increase in the measured vola-
tility of the stocks returns while a ratio smaller than one indicates a decline in the 
aforementioned. To form these ratios the volatility of the stock returns is defined 
by unadjusted volatility and market-adjusted volatility.  
 
The unadjusted volatility is calculated using Kunimotos (1992) estimator over a 
fixed interval surrounding the covered warrant listing date. The market-adjusted 
volatility is calculated by dividing each stock’s unadjusted volatility estimate by 
the matching standard deviation of the market for the same fixed period. This 
method is applied because it adjusts for possible changes in the daily market vola-
tility. These variance ratios are then calculated over three intervals; 30, 60, and 90 
trading days before and after the listing of the warrant. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
are then conducted to examine whether the unadjusted and market-adjusted vola-
tility measures after the warrant listing differ significantly from the period before 
the warrant listing.  
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Kunimotos estimator 
 
In this thesis the volatility parameters of the underlying stock are examined. Thus 
the estimator derived by Kunimoto (1992) used in this thesis will be discussed 
next. 
 
In his paper Kunimoto (1992) proposes a new method for estimating the volatility 
parameters of security prices, improving the estimation method for volatility by 
Parkinsson (1980). Kunimoto (1992) assumes that the security prices follow the 
geometric Brownian motion (12), but in contradiction to a paper by Parkinsson 
(1980) the geometric Brownian motion is allowed to have nonzero drift terms. The 
dependence of the Parkinsson’s (1980) estimator on zero-drift terms stems from the 
fact that Parkinsson (1980) used a density function of the range for the Brownian 
motion originally derived by Feller (1951), in every time interval. This density 
function in turn does depend on the assumption of zero-drift terms. 
 
The reason for choosing this method is that the variance of the unbiased estimator 
derived by Kunimoto (1992) is 10 times lower than the classical estimator (i.e. 
based on the standard deviation of daily closing stock price returns). (Kunimoto 
(1992; Parkinsson 1980) 
 
Kunimotos (1992) unbiased estimator for the variance parameter is given by 
(Kunimoto 1992: 299): 
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Effect size 
Henson (2006) study states that even though statistical significance testing has 
been quite dominant in the resolution of the importance of the acquired results, the 
more contemporary views stress the significance of confidence intervals and effect 
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sizes. Henson (2006) also emphasizes the importance of effect sizes as they “… 
provide one avenue for evaluating practical significance.” (Henson 2006: 606) As 
the available sample size in this thesis is relatively small, an effect size measure is 
needed to accordingly interpret the results.  
Wilcoxon rank-sum test is fairly similar to the standard t-test in regards to effi-
ciency. It is also regarded as the non-parametric alternative to the t-test. The Wil-
coxon rank-sum test also has specific characteristics, which make it more suitable 
to be utilized in this thesis than the standard t-test. This similarity in efficiency 
with the t-test also assisted in finding the appropriate effect size measure when 
controlling for the small sample size utilized in this thesis. In Henson (2006) study 
different effect size measures are paired with various analyses. The t-test is paired 
with Cohen’s d and Glass’s delta. According to Manolov & Solanas (2008) study 
the percentage of non-overlapping data metric is one of the better effect size meas-
ures when working with short data series. As Cohen’s d is regarded as a standard-
ized mean difference effect and can also be interpreted as percentage of non-
overlapping data, choosing Cohen’s d as the effect size metric in this thesis is well 
founded. In this thesis Cohen’s d is calculated as follows (Henson 2006: 609): 
 
(35) 
! 
d =
x post " x pre
# SDpost
2
+# SDpre
2
2
 
 
where 
! 
x post  denotes the mean of the metric in question post warrant listing / an-
nouncement, 
! 
x pre  denotes the mean of the studied metric pre warrant listing / an-
nouncement, 
! 
" SDpost  is the standard deviation of the metric at hand post warrant 
listing / announcement and 
! 
" SDpre  is the standard deviation of the selected metric 
post warrant listing / announcement. (Cohen 1988) 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are divided into three categories in accordance with the 
structure of the theoretical framework. The price impact to the underlying stocks of 
the first time announcement and issuance of covered warrants, along with an 
analysis of the price behavior of the covered warrants, will be discussed first. Sec-
ond results to be analyzed will be the liquidity impact results, including bid-ask 
spread and volume impact analysis. The last results to be examined are the impacts 
that the new covered warrant issuances have on the underlying stocks’ return 
volatility.  
 
Price impact analysis 
 
The price impact results are shown in table 4 and table 5. The tables show the cross 
sectional-mean raw returns, abnormal returns and the associated p-values respec-
tively around the announcement and listing date of the covered call warrants. This 
is followed by an analysis of the summary statistics on the price behavior of first-
time issued covered warrants presented in table 6. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for announcement price impact 
 
 
Note: This table contains the mean raw returns and mean abnormal returns, with their associated  
one-tailed p-values around the announcement date of warrant issuance. The sample used to exam-
ine the price behavior around warrant issuance consists of 14 stocks. Negative (%) refers to the per-
centage of firms in the sample with negative abnormal returns for a given day. Cohen’s d is the ef-
fect size metric used in this thesis. 
 
(N) 14 14 14 14 14
Day Mean p-value Mean p-value Negative(%)
-15 0.0026 0.351 -0.003 0.690 53.3
-14 0.0038 0.366 0 0.499 53.3
-13 -0.0027 0.686 -0.0037 0.749 40
-12 -0.0148 0.969 -0.0106 0.945 60
-11 0.0015 0.408 -0.0035 0.774 53.3
-10 -0.0083 0.837 -0.0034 0.651 46.7
-9 -0.0026 0.591 -0.0075 0.773 60
-8 0.0128 0.097 0.0109 0.091 13.3
-7 0.0001 0.497 0.0018 0.363 40
-6 0.0103 0.020 0.0062 0.064 33.3
-5 -0.001 0.588 -0.0038 0.879 73.3
-4 0.0188 0.089 0.0198 0.040 26.7
-3 0.0023 0.390 0.0049 0.216 40
-2 0.0002 0.487 0.001 0.422 60
-1 0.0008 0.457 -0.0015 0.589 60
0 -0.0003 0.512 0.0058 0.242 33.3
1 0.0036 0.291 0.0017 0.383 53.3
2 -0.0038 0.706 -0.0086 0.934 73.3
3 -0.0029 0.620 -0.0024 0.637 46.7
4 -0.003 0.752 0.0059 0.118 40
5 -0.0077 0.869 -0.0022 0.619 46.7
6 -0.0001 0.504 0.0019 0.422 40
7 -0.0014 0.571 -0.0023 0.639 60
8 0.0027 0.318 0.0048 0.138 40
9 -0.0032 0.667 0.0056 0.212 46.7
10 -0.0077 0.794 -0.0068 0.802 46.7
11 0.0044 0.383 0.0109 0.216 40
12 0.0036 0.298 0.0069 0.129 46.7
13 0.0128 0.001 0.0079 0.020 33.3
14 0.0012 0.406 -0.0017 0.613 66.7
15 -0.0067 0.873 0.0022 0.368 40
Cohen's d -0.217 0.167
Raw returns Abnormal returns
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the announcement price impact analy-
sis. As the null hypothesis of H1 states, there should be a negative price impact fol-
lowing the covered warrant announcement. Covered warrant announcement 
seems to have little or no impact on the underlying stocks raw returns in stark con-
trast to previous studies. On the announcement date a price decline of 0.03 percent 
is found with a corresponding p-value of 0.511. This result is statistically insignifi-
cant. Prior to the announcement date the only statistically significant changes 
found in the raw returns are increases eight, six and four days before the covered 
warrant is announced. 13 days after the warrant announcement a statistically sig-
nificant increase of 1.28% in the raw returns is found, with a corresponding p-value 
of 0.001. In addition to the statistical insignificance, the magnitude of the effect size 
(Cohen’s d = -0.217) is minimal. 
 
The results from the analysis of abnormal returns yield similar returns than those 
of the raw return analysis. Eight, six and four days prior to the announcement sta-
tistically significant increases on the conventional levels of confidence in abnormal 
returns are found. On the announcement day no statistically significant changes 
are to be found on the abnormal returns. Interestingly the Negative (%) seems to 
increase sharply during two days after the announcement date from 33.3% to 
53.5% on day one to 73.3% on day two. This would imply a decrease in the abnor-
mal returns of the underlying, but as the statistical significance is not there and the 
effect size is minute but positive, no sound conclusions can be arrived at. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for issuance price impact 
 
 
Note: This table contains the mean raw returns and mean abnormal returns, with their correspond-
ing one-tailed p-values around the listing dates of the covered warrants. The sample consists of 14 
stocks. Negative (%) relates to the percentage of firms in the sample with negative abnormal returns 
for a given day. Cohen’s d is the effect size metric used in this thesis. 
 
Table 4 reports the results from the analysis of mean raw returns and mean ab-
normal returns of the underlying stocks on a 31-day event window surrounding 
(N) 14 14 14 14 14
Day Mean p-value Mean p-value Negative(%)
-15 -0.0027 0.686 -0.0022 0.658 46.7
-14 -0.0148 0.969 -0.0104 0.942 66.7
-13 0.0015 0.408 -0.0006 0.552 46.7
-12 -0.0083 0.837 -0.0097 0.894 66.7
-11 -0.0026 0.591 -0.0053 0.704 53.3
-10 0.0128 0.097 0.01 0.108 20
-9 0.0001 0.497 0.0007 0.446 46.7
-8 0.0103 0.020 0.0076 0.035 33.3
-7 -0.001 0.588 -0.0016 0.704 60
-6 0.0188 0.089 0.0169 0.065 33.3
-5 0.0023 0.390 0.0055 0.192 40
-4 0.0002 0.487 0.0035 0.248 53.3
-3 0.0008 0.457 -0.0031 0.675 60
-2 -0.0003 0.512 0.0043 0.302 33.3
-1 0.0036 0.291 0.0007 0.450 53.3
0 -0.0038 0.706 -0.0062 0.863 66.7
1 -0.0029 0.620 -0.0011 0.566 40
2 -0.003 0.752 0.0058 0.115 40
3 -0.0077 0.869 -0.0055 0.785 53.3
4 -0.0001 0.504 0.0036 0.352 33.3
5 -0.0014 0.571 -0.0024 0.643 60
6 0.0027 0.318 0.0079 0.021 26.7
7 -0.0032 0.667 0.0055 0.211 46.7
8 -0.0077 0.794 -0.0038 0.674 46.7
9 0.0044 0.383 0.0059 0.327 40
10 0.0036 0.298 0.0065 0.147 40
11 0.0128 0.001 0.0068 0.011 26.7
12 0.0012 0.406 0.0051 0.169 46.7
13 -0.0067 0.873 -0.0058 0.796 46.7
14 -0.0054 0.791 -0.0004 0.522 60
15 -0.0087 0.840 -0.0111 0.865 66.7
Cohen's d -0.056 0.015
Raw returns Abnormal returns
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the covered warrant issuance. According to the null hypothesis of H1 a negative 
impact on the raw and abnormal returns following the warrant introduction 
should be expected. Before the issuance date, a statistically significant increase in 
raw returns at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.05 levels, ten, eight and six days before the issu-
ance respectively is found. Thus even though under conventional levels of confi-
dence statistically significant price increases are found in raw returns before war-
rant issuance, it seems that the derivative issuance has little or nothing to do with 
this increase.  After the covered warrant issuance a statistically very significant in-
crease of 1.28%, with a corresponding p-value of 0.001 is found in raw returns 11 
days after the issuance date. Contradicting the null hypothesis, the only statisti-
cally significant change in the raw returns of the underlying is an increase instead 
of a decrease.  
 
The results from the analysis of the abnormal returns are very similar to those 
found in the raw returns. A statistically significant increase in the abnormal returns 
of the underlying is found ten, eight and six days with corresponding p-values of 
0.108, 0.035 and 0.065 prior to the covered warrant issuance. These aforementioned 
increases in the abnormal returns are confirmed by the Negative (%), with values 
of 20%, 33.3% and 33.3% respectively. Statistically significant increases in abnormal 
returns are found six and eleven days after the warrant issuance date with corre-
sponding p-values of 0.021 and 0.011 respectively. On the warrant issuance date no 
significant change in the abnormal returns is to be found. As was the case with raw 
return results, the only changes in abnormal returns of the underlying that are sta-
tistically significant are increases. And as was the case with announcement, the ef-
fect sizes of the price impacts found around the warrant issuance are close to zero 
(Cohen’s d values for raw and abnormal returns are -0.056 and 0.015 respectively). 
Thus the null hypothesis of H1 must be rejected. These results are contradictory to 
the findings of Aitken et al. (2005) who find no significant increase in raw returns 
prior to the warrant issuance and a statistically significant increase on the issuance 
date.  
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Table 6. The price behavior of first-time issued warrants 
Note: In this table the summary statistics on the price behavior of first-time issued covered warrants 
are presented. The table is divided into six event windows, three of which are Postlisting (i.e. after 
the listing of the warrant) and three are Pre-exit (i.e. before the end of maturity of the warrant). The 
analysis extends up to 15 trading days after listing (0,15) and before the end of maturity (-15,0) date 
of the warrant. To test for statistically significant differences in the Postlisting and Pre-exit event 
windows a Wilcoxon rank-sum test is utilized.  
 
Following the price behavior analysis of the underlying stocks is the analysis of the 
price behavior of covered warrants in table 6. Using six event windows up to 15 
trading days after the warrant listing and 15 days before the warrant exit date, 
warrant prices after the listing are compared to those before the exit date. A Wil-
coxon rank-sum test is conducted to search for statistically significant differences 
in the aforementioned prices.   
 
As table 6 reports, five days around the listing and end of maturity dates of the 
covered warrants no statistically significant differences in the means of the war-
rants prices can be found. It seems that in contrast with Aitken et al. (2005) the 
warrant prices 5 days after the listing date are not significantly higher than the 
prices 5 days before the end of maturity date. Nevertheless when extending the 
analysis to cover ten days Postlisting and Pre-exit a statistically significant differ-
ence is found with a p-value of 0.027 and a corresponding Z-statistic of -1.934. This 
result is statistically significant at the five percent confidence level. It seems that 
when the event window is expanded, the warrant prices after listing are signifi-
cantly higher than Pre-exit prices. As the event window is further expanded to 
cover 15 days around the aforementioned dates the significance of the difference 
diminishes slightly with a p-value of 0.03. This change in significance is infinitesi-
mally small confirming that the warrant prices are significantly higher after the 
warrant listing. These results confirm the diminishing time value of the covered 
Estimation interval (0,5) (-5,0) (0,10) (-10,0) (0,15) (-15,0)
Sample size (N) 66 121 176
Statistic Postlisting Pre-exit Postlisting Pre-exit Postlisting Pre-exit
Mean 0.2420 0.0133 0.2209 0.0125 0.2218 0.0204
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 1.7000 0.4500 1.7000 0.4500 1.7000 0.4500
Standard deviation 0.4737 0.0565 0.4206 0.0472 0.3961 0.0584
Z-statistic -1.029 -1.934 -1.881
p-value 0.152 0.027 0.03
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warrants. It also gives room to hypothesize that the warrant issuers could be able 
to gain profits by securing higher premiums a few days after the warrant listing 
with a possibility to buy them back before maturity at a lower cost. 
 
The results derived from these statistical tests are inconclusive. Even though the 
data used consists of all the warrants issued from the whole period that warrants 
have been traded in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (formerly Helsinki Stock Ex-
change), there still are only 14 individual stocks found. Nonetheless, the results are 
quite different from previous studies; it seems that none of the characteristics of 
price impacts of covered warrants to the underlying stocks found in the previous 
studies are to be found in the Finnish stock market. The stock prices seem to be un-
affected by the first time issuance of warrants.  
 
When interpreting the results from the raw- and abnormal returns, the only con-
clusion that can be arrived at is that if the announcement of the covered warrants 
have an impact on the prices of the underlying, it is more likely to be an increase 
than a decrease. Further evidence for this notion is presented in the effect size met-
rics as effect sizes for both announcement and issuance abnormal returns are posi-
tive. The reason for these statistical inconsistencies might be that only a few large 
companies dominate the Finnish stock market making the sample statistically 
skewed and bias. The other explanation could be that as the stocks of the large 
companies are already highly traded and speculated on, the announcement of cov-
ered warrants on them is more likely to be expected by the markets. This explana-
tion is dependent on the assumption that the Finnish stock market is information-
ally efficient. The changes in raw- and abnormal returns would then already be in-
corporated in the underlying before the announcement of the covered warrants by 
the expectations of the informed traders.  
 
This gives also room for speculating on whether or not the covered warrants are 
the source of the change in the stocks behavior or are certain kinds of stock with 
certain anticipated characteristics selected to cater for the issuers needs. It also 
needs to be noted that the sample size available is relatively small. Still in accor-
dance with theory and a the study conducted by Aitken et al. (2005) statistically 
significant differences are found in the prices of covered warrants after the listing 
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and before the exit date. The covered warrant prices are significantly higher right 
after the warrant listing than before the end of maturity. 
 
Moneyness analysis 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the moneyness analysis. Results from the analysis 
are in line with the results from the study conducted by Aitken et al. (2005). As 
warrant holders are only 35.2% of the trading days in a profit position, warrants do 
not seem to be the best source of profits for private investors. Clearly the warrant 
issuers are able to trade warrants very profitably. As concluded in the price analy-
sis of the covered warrants in table 6 it also seems that they are able to issue them 
so that initial premiums received are higher than those preceding the exit date of 
the warrant. This again gives room to hypothesize on which market dominates the 
other. These results seem to indicate that stocks are selected with certain attributes 
to cater for the needs of financial intermediaries dealing with warrants. This also 
raises questions on whether or not these warrants are issued because the issuers 
want to make the market place more complete and efficient, or is the motivation 
more profit oriented. 
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Table 7. First time issued covered warrants, moneyness analysis   
 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the moneyness analysis. The mean percentages of which the 
warrant holders are in a profit (in the money) or loss (out of the money) position in seven event 
windows are presented. The event windows include up to 15 days after the warrant is listed, up to 
15 days before the warrant reaches maturity and the whole life of the warrants.  
 
 
Liquidity impact analysis 
 
The impact of new warrant introductions to the underlying stocks liquidity is stud-
ied by using two distinct metrics; relative bid-ask spreads and relative trading vol-
ume. The null hypothesis of H2 is that the underlying stocks liquidity should in-
crease following the covered warrant introduction. 
 
 
(N)
(+) (-)
30.00 70.00 60
30.00 70.00 110
27.50 72.50 160
(+) (-)
40.00 60.00 60
41.82 58.18 110
42.50 57.50 160
35.20 64.80Whole sample mean
Pre-exit
(-5,0)
(-10,0)
(-15,0)
Mean percentage of trading days 
of which the warrant holders are 
in the money or out of the 
money
0,10
(0,15)
Event window
Post-listing
0,5
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Table 8. Relative and market-adjusted bid-ask spreads and relative trading volume 
around warrant listing 
Note: The summary statistics of relative bid-ask spreads, market-adjusted bid-ask spreads and rela-
tive trading volume pre-warrant and post-warrant listings are reported in this table. To test for sta-
tistically significant differences between the chosen metrics during the three event intervals, a one 
tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test is utilized. Cohen’s d refers to the effect size estimator used. Positive 
(%) relates to the quantity of stocks for which relative spreads, market-adjusted spreads and rela-
tive trading volume are on average higher in the post warrant listing period. 
 
 
In table 8 the results of the liquidity analysis are presented. A wilcoxon rank-sum 
test is used to identify statistically significant differences in the Pre- and Post-
listing periods. The magnitude and direction of these differences is then found via 
comparing the means and the Positive percentage. In addition, owing to the fact 
that the sample sizes are relatively small, the effect sizes for the aforementioned 
tests are calculated. The effect size metric selected is Cohen’s d. The tests are con-
ducted in six event windows; 30, 60 and 90 days before and after the covered war-
Estimation interval +/-30 +/-60 +/-90
Sample size (N) 14 14 14
Statistic Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 0.0045 0.0076 0.0056 0.0076 0.0066 0.0074
Median 0.0020 0.0023 0.0020 0.0023 0.0021 0.0024
Z-statistic -2.131 -1.771 -1.417
p-value 0.017 0.039 0.078
Cohen's d 0.179 0.115 0.041
Positive (%) 50.0% 42.9% 42.9%
Statistic Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 0.1362 0.2190 0.1544 0.2353 0.1741 0.2300
Median 0.0727 0.0862 0.0778 0.0848 0.0812 0.0862
Z-statistic -1.008 -0.980 -1.319
p-value 0.157 0.164 0.094
Cohen's d 0.183 0.134 0.111
Positive (%) 57.1% 42.9% 50.0%
Statistic Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 535.86 640.43 555.87 748.14 528.05 840.23
Median 261.61 274.26 246.50 269.13 238.45 263.59
Z-statistic -0.236 -1.220 -2.526
p-value 0.638 0.111 0.006
Cohen's d 0.153 3.648 6.428
Positive (%) 0.0% 42.9% 42.9%
Panel A: Relative bid-ask spread around warrant listing
Panel B: Market-adjusted bid-ask spread around warrant listing
Panel C: Relative trading volume around warrant listing
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rant listings.  The table itself is divided into three panels Panel A, Panel B and 
Panel C including results from relative bid-ask spread, market-adjusted bid-ask 
spread and relative trading volume impacts respectively 
 
The relative bid-ask spread results are shown in Panel A of table 8. The results 
seem to indicate that the increase in relative bid-ask spreads found by Aitken et al. 
(2005) seems to be occurring also in the Finnish stock market. Nonetheless differ-
ing conclusions are arrived at. Depending on the time span, the statistical signifi-
cance of the rise in the mean of the relative spreads seems to increase the shorter 
the selected interval is. In the 30-, 60- and 90-day intervals the means of the relative 
bid-ask spreads increase by 66.6%, 35.7% and 12.1%, with corresponding p-values 
of 0.017, 0.039 and 0.078 respectively. These p-values are statistically significant at 
the 0.1 level of confidence.  
 
Similar behavior is found in the effect sizes; as the time span is increased the effect 
size decreases. In the shortest time interval an effect size of 0.179 is found, this re-
lates to an approximate percent of non-overlap of 13%. As this is the highest effect 
size found in relative bid-ask spreads analysis and it is declining in nature as the 
time interval is increased, the effect size results give further evidence against in-
creasing spreads.  
 
The Positive percentage denotes the quantity of stocks with higher than average 
relative bid-ask spreads. These percentages show that even though there seems to 
be a statistically significant rise in the relative means, the rise in these means is 
concentrated on certain stocks and cannot be generalized as being the result of the 
warrant introductions. Also contradicting Aitken et al. (2005) results, the rise in the 
relative bid-ask spreads means seems to diminish the longer the time interval.  
 
The results from the market-adjusted bid-ask spread analysis, shown in Panel B of 
table 8, confirms the results from Panel A, as similar rise in the means is found, 
now without the statistical significance for the 30- and 60-day intervals. A statisti-
cally significant rise in the mean with a p-value significant at the 1 percent confi-
dence level is found at the 90-day interval. The greater p-values of the market-
adjusted spreads also give further confirmation to the conclusion that no signifi-
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cant difference is to be found between the pre- and post-warrant introduction time 
periods or that these differences are not stemming from the warrant introductions. 
When interpreting the Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-values from both the relative- and 
market-adjusted panels, it seems that the market fluctuations responsible for the 
results in panel A are corrected in the market-adjusted analysis and can thus be as-
sumed to have originated from the overall movement of the market.  
 
This assumption is reinforced by the effect size analysis results. Similar behavior to 
the effect sizes in the relative spread analysis is found in the market-adjusted 
spread analysis. In the market-adjusted spreads the magnitude by which the effect 
size decreases is much smaller than in the case of the relative spreads. This again 
implies that the statistically significant p-values witnessed in the relative spread 
analysis stem from some other factors than covered warrant introductions. In con-
clusion is seems that the covered warrant introduction has little or no effect to the 
bid-ask spreads of the underlying stocks. This result is in accordance with studies 
of Chamberlain et al. (1993) and Wei et al. (1997) who study the impacts of options 
in Canadian and the US markets respectively. 
 
Panel C of table 8 reports the changes in the relative trading volume before and af-
ter the warrant listing. In the 30-day time window no significant increase in vol-
ume is found, it almost seems as if the volume of the underlying diminishes right 
after the covered warrant introduction as the Positive percentage, referring to the 
proportion of firms for which the relative trading volume is higher on average, is 
0%. Nonetheless as the corresponding p-value is 0.638 no statistically significant 
difference can be found in the 30-day time interval. The significance of the differ-
ence in volume rises sharply when the analysis is expanded into 60-day window, 
as the Z-statistic is -1.220 with a corresponding p-value of 0.111, virtually statisti-
cally significant at the 0.1 level. The Positive (%) also rises from 0% to 42.9%, this 
being still below the 50% threshold; no statistically sound conclusions can be ar-
rived at. When the time span is further expanded into 90-days before and after the 
warrant listing, a statistically significant difference is found at the highest level of 
confidence, with a corresponding p-value of 0.006 and a Z-statistic of -2.526. Even 
though the means are statistically highly different in the 90-day time period exam-
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ined, the Positive (%) is still only 42.9%. This means that less than half of the exam-
ined stocks show higher volumes after the warrant introduction. 
 
The effect size measures give more interesting results. In the first 30-day interval 
Cohen’s d gives a value of 0.153, which is a minute effect size in any regards. When 
the interval is expanded to cover 60- and 90-days the effect sizes rise drastically to 
3.648 and 6.428 respectively. This can be indicates that 60- and 90 days after the 
warrant introduction the underlying volumes are, on average, 3.648 and 6.428 
standard deviations higher than before the warrant introduction. These effect size 
values are extremely high. 
 
With the aforementioned finding in mind, it has to be taken into account that the 
time interval studied in this thesis was a period of almost constant growth of the 
overall market. Still as the rises in volumes are accompanied with statistically sig-
nificant p-values and the effect size metric gives such extreme values it can be con-
cluded that this witnessed rise in the underlying volume can be attributed to the 
issuance of covered warrants. This is in line with the majority of the previous stud-
ies (e.g. Draper et al. 2001, Aitken et al. 2005), which conclude that derivative in-
troductions are followed by a rise in the underlying volume.  
 
Volatility impact analysis 
 
In this section the volatility impact of the new covered warrant listings on the un-
derlying stocks is examined. The volatility impact is of great interest as the one of 
the key elements in defining the price and thus value of the warrant to the issuer 
through premiums, is the volatility of the underlying. Volatility is also one of the 
key measures of risk in the markets of today. 
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Table 9. Unadjusted and market-adjusted volatility ratios around warrant listing 
Note: This table reports the Unadjusted and market-adjusted volatility ratios for three distinct time 
intervals of 30, 60 and 90 days around warrant listings. The post-warrant listing volatility estimate 
of the underlying is divided by the estimated volatility before the listing. The volatility measure is 
calculated using Kunitomo’s estimator. A one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test is utilized to test for 
statistically significant differences in the mean volatility. Cohen’s d refers to the effect size estimator 
used. Positive (%) denotes the quantity of stocks with higher than average volatility in the post 
warrant listing period. 
 
 
The volatility impact results, measured by the unadjusted volatility, are presented 
in Panel A of table 9. In accordance with the null hypothesis of H3, there should be 
an increase in the underlying stocks volatility following the warrant listing. None-
theless, in all of the time intervals studied, no statistically significant differences in 
the unadjusted volatilities of the underlying stocks can be found. Even though the 
Positive (%) in the 30-day estimation interval is 57.1%, implicating that more than 
50 percent of the underlying in the sample showed elevated volatility following the 
listing of the warrant, the corresponding p-value is 0.445, insignificant in any of the 
conventional levels of confidence. Similarly insignificant p-values are arrived at 
when expanding the length of the estimation interval to 60- and 90-days around 
the listing dates. The effect size of the unadjusted volatility ratio is also minute 
with values close to zero. In addition the effect size values found are all negative, 
which contradicts the null hypothesis of H3. It seems that when measured with 
Estimation interval +/-30 +/-60 +/-90
Sample size (N) 14 14 14
Panel A: Unadjusted volatility ratio
Mean 1.0218 0.9799 1.0096
Median 1.0131 0.9545 1.0570
Z-statistic -0.138 -0.459 -0.138
p-value 0.445 0.323 0.445
Cohen's d -0.009 -0.053 -0.006
Positive (%) 57.1% 42.9% 57.1%
Panel B: Market-adjusted volatility ratio
Mean 0.8923 0.9381 0.9313
Median 0.8716 0.9533 0.9120
Z-statistic -1.103 -0.414 -0.551
p-value 0.135 0.334 0.291
Cohen's d -0.354 -0.168 -0.302
Positive (%) 21.4% 35.7% 28.6%
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volatility estimates unadjusted by the overall fluctuations of the market, the vola-
tility of the underlying stays fairly stable around covered warrant listings. 
 
Panel B of table 9 reports the market-adjusted volatility ratios of the underlying 
stocks surrounding the covered warrant listing dates. As with the unadjusted vola-
tility ratios, no statistical significance is to be found in the results presented in 
Panel B. In the 30-day estimation interval around the warrant listing the Positive 
percentage is 21.4% with a corresponding p-value of 0.135 and a Z-statistic of -
1.103. This result is the most statistically significant result arrived at in table 9. 
Here, after volatility ratios are subjected to the market adjustments, it seems that 
the overall volatility of the underlying is declining after the warrant introduction 
in the 30-day estimation interval.  
 
This is also found in the effect sizes surrounding warrant introductions. With 
Cohen’s d values of -0.354, -0.168 and -0.302 for the 30-, 60- and 90-day intervals 
respectively it seems that the adjusted volatility of the underlying is slightly lower 
after the warrant introduction. This then implies again that the underlying stocks 
volatility is, if not unaffected, certainly not elevated by the introduction of covered 
warrants. These findings contradict the findings of Bollen (1998) and Aitken et al. 
(2005) who find that volatility of the underlying is elevated following warrant in-
troduction. Thus in accordance with Sahlström (2001) and the overall consensus of 
the previous studies, covered warrant introductions seem to have a more stabiliz-
ing than de-stabilizing effect on the underlying stocks volatility in the Finnish 
stock market. 
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6. Conclusions and further studies 
 
The results of the price analysis are far from conclusive, and also contradictory to 
the results of Aitken et al. (2005). None of the characteristics of the price impacts 
found by Aitken et al. (2005) are present in the Finnish stock market. On the an-
nouncement and issuance date no statistically significant changes in either raw- or 
abnormal returns are found. As all of the statistically significant changes found are 
increases in the selected metrics and the effect sizes found are very small, the only 
possible change is an increase. Thus the null hypothesis of H1 must be rejected. 
The results from the price behavior of the covered warrants are more conclusive. 
Statistically significant differences are found after the listing and before the exit 
date. The conclusion of the covered warrant price analysis is that the covered war-
rant prices are significantly higher right after the warrant listing than before the 
end of maturity. 
 
The results from the moneyness analysis, combined with the results of the covered 
warrant price behavior analysis conducted also reminds about the nature of the 
issuers, and the motives behind these issuance decisions. The investors are in a 
profit position approximately only one thirds of the time that the warrants are 
alive. In addition, as the covered warrant prices are significantly higher right after 
the warrant listing than before maturity, the issuers are able to secure high premi-
ums. When the covered warrant prices then decline, it is possible for the issuer to 
buy the warrants back with a reduced price. Thus the covered warrants seem to 
lead to significant wealth transfers from private investors to financial intermediar-
ies. 
 
The liquidity analysis also produced mixed results. The conclusion arrived at in 
the bid-ask spread analysis is similar to the price impact analysis conclusion; if 
covered warrant introductions have any impact on the bid-ask spreads, it is likely 
to be an increase. The volume of the underlying seems to experience a small rise 
after the warrant introduction. As this finding is backed up by the extremely large 
effect sizes found it is in line with the majority of the previous studies, even though 
the rise in volume found comes with a 30-day delay. Following these results, the 
null hypothesis of H2 is accepted. 
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The impact that the covered warrant introductions have on the underlying stocks 
volatility is also somewhat inconclusive. As some decline is witnessed in the un-
derlying volatility 30 days after the warrant introduction, the statistical signifi-
cance of this decline diminishes rapidly when the analysis is extended into 60- or 
90-days. This implies that the warrant introduction has a relatively small impact, 
which is declining in nature, on the volatility of the underlying. The effect size val-
ues confirm the declining nature of the volatilities for the adjusted metrics. The 
null hypothesis of H3 is thus rejected. Thus the overall impact that the covered 
warrant issuance has on the market place seems to be more stabilizing than desta-
bilizing.  
 
The overall inconclusiveness of the results could stem from the fact that the Fin-
nish market is very informationally efficient, and thus the real impacts are wit-
nessed beyond the 181-day time interval chosen in this thesis. It could also be that 
the covered warrants are not the cause of these changes, but rather the effect. This 
would then lead to the conclusion that certain stocks which have shown recent im-
provements in market quality are selected to serve as the underlying asset for the 
warrant. Nonetheless the key attribute for such inconclusive results seems to be the 
small sample size used, despite the fact that all of the first time introduced covered 
warrants were included in the sample. (Danielsen, Van Ness and Warr 2007) 
 
It also needs to be noted that on the question of making the markets more complete 
and efficient, options with identical or similar traits than warrants are available 
with similar prices. Admitting that options do not give similar room to speculation 
with higher transaction costs, in light of the findings of this thesis and the overall 
market situation, a fair question could be asked; is more speculation really neces-
sary? (Bartram & Fehle 2007) 
 
Topics for further studies are in abundance. Firstly the statistical correlations of the 
price, liquidity and volatility metrics in this thesis should be studied further. 
Cross-sectional OLS Regressions of the after-to-before and before-to-after metrics 
could also be implemented to further verify the results of this thesis. Also the ques-
tion on whether or not the covered warrant issuance is an endogenous event or not 
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should be studied in the Finnish stock market. Secondly it would be interesting to 
investigate whether or not the Nordic warrant issuers use the implied volatility as 
a way to increase the premiums that they receive. In this hypothetical scenario the 
implied volatilities are purposely set as “too high” to artificially increase the war-
rants risk measure and the premiums received by the issuer. Thirdly the relation-
ship of the options markets and the covered warrant market in Finland should be 
studied, as overlapping instruments with very differing prices are found in both. 
Fourth as some of the warrants in this study are so called turbo warrants, a topic to 
study further is the relationship of the covered call and put warrants to the turbo 
calls and puts. Do turbo warrants champion the new wave of market efficiency or 
are they only new means to speculate and transfer wealth? 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: The efficiency of Kunimotos estimator 
 
The efficiency of Kunimotos (1998) estimator versus the classical estimator 
 
“Kunimotos (1998) unbiased estimator of 
! 
" 2 is given by 
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ˆ " 2(k) =
1
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The classical estimator is based on a transformed Brownian motion (given in equa-
tion (12)) process. The transformed process 
! 
X(t) = ln(S(t)) (security price 
! 
S(t)  at 
! 
t ) 
follows the Brownian motion with the drift parameter 
! 
µ'= µ "# 2 /2 and the vari-
ance parameter 
! 
" 2 by Itô’s lemma. Allowing that the drift parameter 
! 
µ' of 
! 
X(t)}{  is 
not necessarily zero, dividing the interval 
! 
0,nT[ ] into 
! 
n  intervals of 
! 
(i "1)T,iT[ ] 
! 
(i =1,...,n)  and defining the rate of return on 
! 
S(t)}{ , in the 
! 
ith interval  as 
! 
d
i
= ln S(iT)}{ " ln S((i "1)T)}{ where 
! 
S((i "1)T)  should be interpreted as both the clos-
ing price in the 
! 
(i "1)th interval and the opening price in the 
! 
ith interval. Having 
! 
n  
observations on 
! 
d
i
}{  in 
! 
n  intervals, the classical sample variance estimator (
! 
ˆ " 2(c)) 
of the parameter 
! 
" 2 is given by  
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,where 
! 
d = (1/n) d
i
i=1
n
"  and 
! 
T  is the length of each interval. 
 
LEMMA. Suppose that a Brownian bridge process 
! 
Y (t)}{  in 
! 
0,T[ ]  is given by (12) 
and Kunimotos (1992) transformation 
! 
Y (t) = X(t) "
t
T
X(T). Defining the adjusted 
range 
! 
R by 
! 
R
i
=max
t"I
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Y (t) #min
t"I
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Y (t). Then for 
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where 
! 
" (p)  is Riemann’s 
! 
"  function, and for 
! 
p =1, 
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(38) 
! 
E(R) ="
T#
2
 
 
The efficiency of Kunimotos (1992) estimator against the classical estimator 
! 
ˆ " 2(c) is 
then computed by using the lemma for 
! 
p = 4  and 
! 
" (4) = # 4 /90 . This gives  
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Since it is known that 
! 
var( ˆ " 2(c)) = 2" 4 /(n #1), we have 
 
(40) 
! 
var ˆ " 2(c)}{
var ˆ " 2(k)}{
=10
n
n #1
 
 
Thus Kunimotos (1992) estimator is 10 times more efficient in comparison to the 
classical estimator.” (Kunimoto (1992: 2-5) 
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APPENDIX 2: Announcement, introduction and maturity dates of the warrants 
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